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Rethinking the Class Action:

A Policy Primer on Reformt
JOHN C. COFE JR.*

Today, virtually everyone has a proposal for "reforming" class action
litigation but both consensus and coherence are lacking. Some proposals are
bluntly restrictive. For example, the Reagan Administration would reduce
attorney's fees, place a ceiling on product liability, and partially repeal treble
damage statutes.' In the same vein, the United States Supreme Court has
shown itself parsimonious on the question of fee awards, by authorizing fee
waivers, 2 approving offers of settlement that seemingly permit fee shifting
against the plaintiff's attorney, 3 and curtailing the traditional bases on which
a fee award may be enhanced. 4 Other proposals have offered essentially
neutral procedural reforms; new criteria for fee awards, 5 new pleading requirements, 6 expanded hearings at the settlement approval stage, 7 procedures
for the appointment of special guardians,' the greater use of sanctions for

t Copyright 1987 by John C. Coffee Jr.
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author wishes
to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Henry Monaghan.
1. See Pastzor, Cabinet Maps Easing of Antitrust Law; Business Groups Think Plon Is
Too Bold, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1985, at 6, col. 1. For a similar proposal by a bar association
committee, see Report on Treble Damages, 40 REc. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 647, 660 (1985). For the

Reagan Administration's proposals to limit jury awards and attorney's fees, see Pear, Administration Submits Plan to Reduce Damages Awards, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at B9, col. 1,
2. See Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986).
3. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). Marek does not hold that the defendant's fees
may be shifted against the plaintiff under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but its logic points to this conclusion. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of Rule 68's impact, see Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEoAL STuD. 93, 95
(1986).
4. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106 S. Ct. 3088
(1986) (fee award may not be enhanced because of merit or skill of plaintiff's attorneys).
Delaware Valley held over for reargument next term the even more important issue of whether
the factor of risk may justify an enhancement of the fee award when the plaintiff's attorneys
are compensated on a contingent fee basis. See infra note 32 for a further discussion of this
case's significance.
5, For recent persuasive arguments, see Note, Derivative Suit Settlements: In Search of a
New Lodestar, 48 LAw & CNmn'. PROBS. 229 (Summer 1985); Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CoRNELL L. REv. 529 (1978), Leubsdorf, The Contingency
Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YAa.n L,J, 473 (1981).
6. See Marcus, The Revival of FactPleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
86 CoLum. L. REy, 433 (1986). But see Note, PleadingSecurities FraudClaims with Particularity
under Rule 9(b), 97 Hy. L, Ray. 1432 (1984),
7. See Note, Abuse in PlaintiffClassAction Settlements: The Needfor a GuardianDuring
PretrialSettlement Negotiations, 84 MycH, L. Rev, 308 (1985),
8, Note, supra note 5.
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the filing of frivolous actions,9 and greater coordination among federal and
state judges. 0 Conversely, a third group of proposals seeks to expand and

streamline the use of class actions. An ABA Committee has recommended
that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to allow
federal judges to certify virtually any maintainable class action as a mandatory class action," and several commentators have urged an expanded use

of the mandatory class action in the case of the mass tort action.' 2 Still, a
recent Supreme Court decision may halt this incipient trend because it seems
to imply that the right to opt out from the class action has a constitutional
dimension as an element of due process. 3 Policy issues thus overlap with
constitutional ones because the rights of the individual plaintiff frequently

come into conflict with those of the plaintiff class as a whole.
Largely lacking in this recent outpouring of commentary has been any
sustained focus on the incentive effects on the plaintiff's attorney of these

proposed reforms. This Article will focus on incentives and the unstable
dynamics within the large class action. To evaluate them it is first necessary

to understand the context itself. Frequently, commentators begin with such
a preface and then turn to very specific contexts: antitrust class actions,
products liability cases, securities litigation, "mass disaster" cases, civil rights
litigation, and so on. Although this tendency to subdivide the field into

9. In 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to require a
pre-filing inquiry by an attorney into both the factual and legal basis for a pleading, motion
or other paper. According to the principal decision interpreting this new requirement, it substitutes an objective standard in place of the prior "bad faith" or subjective standard governing
the imposition of sanctions. See Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Rauenhorst v. United States, 104 F.R.D. 588 (D. Minn. 1985). One survey has found that
sanctions imposed under Rule 11 are now three times more likely to be imposed against the
plaintiff than the defendant. See Marcotte, Rule 11 Changes, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 34.
10. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 CoLtm. J.
ENvTh. L. 1, 25, 47 (1986).

11. See Gruenberger, Plansfor Class-Action Reform, Nat'l L.J., July 8, 1985, at 32, col.
1 (reporting recommendation of Special Committee on Class Action Improvements of the
Litigation Section of the American Bar Association).
12. See Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 IHRv.
L. Rnv. 1143, 1160-61 (1983); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System, 97 HA1v. L. REv. 849 (1984); Mullenix, Class
Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed FederalProcedureAct, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1039
(1986). But see Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 38-56 (1986).
13. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), the Court upheld Kansas'
exercise of jurisdiction over a multistate class action in which the vast majority of the plaintiffs
had no connection with Kansas. In so doing, the Court seems to have assumed that the right
to opt out is a fundamental due process requirement. Id. at 811-14. Some commentators have
suggested that "[tihe conclusion seems to follow that Shutts prohibits mandatory class actions."
See Miller & Crump, supra note 12, at 39. While this conclusion may follow from Shutts, I
doubt that the Supreme Court will follow this conclusion outside the context of a state court
forum. See also In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), vacated, 791
F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1986).

19871

RETHINKING CLASS ACTION

specialized subcategories is understandable (because it allows each expert to
stress the uniqueness of his or her context and to plead for specially tailored
rules), such a taxonomic approach obscures the common denominators among
these distinct subcategories. The starting point for this Article is the recognition that the similarities overwhelm the differences-that there is a
broader context that this Article will describe as that of "entrepreneurial
litigation." Today, most observers would probably concede that some litigation contexts-most notably, derivative, securities, and antitrust litigation-are ones in which the plaintiff's attorney functions in such an
"entrepreneurial" mode, but they might resist this description as applying
to mass tort or products liability litigation. Yet, any attempt to draw categorical lines among these contexts is suspect, unless we can distinguish these
contexts in terms of objective criteria. Part I will seek to identify these
relevant characteristics and thereby to define "entrepreneurial litigation."
Its focus is largely on the relationship between the adversaries and how it
is shaped by the relative presence or absence of the factors that distinguish
entrepreneurial litigation.
Part II will then turn to the internal dynamics within the large class action.
Recently, writers have advanced provocative models of how to reform the class
action in order to achieve "public law" objectives. Courts also have noted the
4
"desperate need" for a new procedural vehicle by which to remedy mass torts.'
Although I am sympathetic to those needs, significant problems of distributive
fairness arise under these proposals that have not received adequate attention.
The large class action is an unstable coalition of persons with different and
conflicting interests. To understand the tensions within the class, it is useful
to examine the experience in related contexts-such as collective bargaining
negotiations and corporate re-organizations in bankruptcy-where claimants
have also had to dispute among themselves over the distribution of a limited
fund. The pattern in these analogous areas is not encouraging; repeatedly, it
has been observed that one class of interests is subordinated to, or submerged
within, a larger or stronger class with divergent interests. Moreover, as Part
III will note, to the extent that protections have been accorded to minority
interests in these related areas, either through voting rules or substantive legal
standards, these protections do not seem to be realistically replicable in the
class action context. As a result, the right to opt out of the action gains
increased significance. Yet at the same time, broad recognition of the right to
opt out can give rise to a classic "prisoner's dilemma" problem that works to
the disadvantage of all plaintiffs. Against this backdrop, Part III wil consider
what compromises are possible.

14. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (en
banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986) ("desperate need exists for federal legislation in the
field of asbestos litigation").
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Tim NATURE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION

This section will stress four generalizations that relate to the performance
of plaintiff's attorneys in the large class action. As a matter of exposition,
it is simplest to set forth these generalizations as naked assertions and then
to examine each more closely:
1. High agency costs characterize class action litigation, and permit
opportunistic behavior by attorneys; as a result, it is more accurate as
a descriptive matter to view the attorney as an independent entrepreneur
than as an agent of the client.
2. Class actions necessarily involve asymmetric stakes, meaning that
defendants are prepared to expend greater resources on the prosecution
of the action than are the plaintiff's attorneys because the former have
more at stake.
3. An initial cost differential tends to favor the plaintiff's side in many
types of class action litigation, thereby inviting the filing of actions having
a low prospect of success at trial. While this factor may offset or
overcome the asymmetric stakes factor, its significance erodes during the
course of the litigation.
4. The absence of a clearly specified property right in the class action
gives rise to a classic "common pool" problem that discourages investment by the attorney in the action and produces wasteful competition
among plaintiff's attorneys that can be exploited by defendants.

These four assertions-high agency costs, asymmetric stakes, a cost differential, and a "common pool" problem-are far from the only generalizations that can be advanced about the likely behavior of plaintiff's attorneys
in class action litigation, but they apply with considerable force over the
greatest range. Other generalizations depend upon more contingent factors,

such as the specific fee award formula used by the court, the availability of
fee shifting, and applicability of specific procedural rules. Each of these
four generalizations will next be examined more closely.

A.

The Agency Cost Problem

It is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest can arise in class action
litigation between attorney and client.'

5

In the language of economics, this

6

is an "agency cost" problem.' All principal-agent relationships are said to
give rise to agency costs, which by definition consist of: (1) the costs of
monitoring the agent, (2) the costs the agent incurs to advertise or guarantee

15. For classic statements on this problem by Judge Friendly, see Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby,
333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion); Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 899900 (2d Cir. 1972),
16. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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his fidelity ("bonding" costs), and (3) the
residual level of opportunistic
17
behavior that it is inefficient to prevent.
Although the theory of agency costs is well-known, the class action context
is distinctive in several respects. Obviously, the members of the plaintiff
class usually have very little capacity to monitor their agents. While this
same observation could also be made, for example, about shareholders, who
are typically widely dispersed and have too small an investment on an
individual basis to justify substantial monitoring expenditures, two factors
differentiate these different principal-agent relationships. First, the critical
decisions in litigation typically have lower visibility and require greater expertise to understand than in the case of the shareholder-manager relationship
(where at least publicly reported financial statements and the financial press
reveal much and supply a basis for comparison). Second, no public market
exists in the case of the attorney-client relationship to motivate the agent to
serve the interests of the principal; that is, the client may neither sell his
ownership interest, nor may the attorney buy such an interest, in a secondary
market. Academic as this observation sounds, it has considerable significance.
Under the standard theory of agency costs, the shareholders, as principals,
can compensate the managers, as their agents, through stock options and
similar devices in order to align their interests with those of the shareholders
and thereby reduce the agent's incentive to act opportunistically. The absence
of such an informed and active market for legal claims removes the standard
mechanism for aligning the attorney's self-interest with that of his clients,
and requires that we turn to imperfect substitutes. In addition, the market
for legal services works inefficiently at best in the case of class actions
because few clients are informed or motivated enough to investigate the
reputations of attorneys. Indeed, as a practical matter, the attorney often
finds the client only after the attorney has first prepared the action. To be
sure, the attorney has an interest in his reputation, but it is the court, not
the client, that he needs most to impress, and the court's interests, as a
regulatory body, may not be the same as the client's. For example, the court
may want expeditious settlements, not maximized recoveries.
One means does exist, however, by which clients can seek to reduce agency
costs and align their attorney's interests with their own: they can compensate
their attorney under a percentage-of-the-recovery fee formula, which is, in
effect, the fundamental analogue of the stock option device used by shareholders. Although this fee arrangement does give the attorney an interest in
maximizing the size of the recovery (and prevents collusive agreements under
which the plaintiff's attorney can exchange a low settlement for a high fee

17. Id. For example, because it is not cost efficient in isolation to spend $10 on a burglar
alarm or on auditing systems to prevent an expected loss of $9, such loss would be rationally
accepted as an unavoidable residual cost.
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paid by the defendants), economic analysis suggests that the percentage-ofthe-recovery fee formula leads to "premature" settlements (that is, settlements that properly informed clients would reject). 8 In any event, the percentage-of-the-recovery formula is no longer the dominant fee formula, at
least not in federal courts. Except in a few special areas, it has been largely
superceded by the "lodestar formula," which essentially compensates the
plaintiff's attorney based on the time the attorney reasonably expended on
the action.1 9 It should take little time or analysis to recognize that the lodestar
creates a perverse incentive for delay. 20 Predictably, once time is equated
with money, those lawyers who cannot be closely monitored by their clients
will procrastinate or engage in more "makework" and overstaffing than if
they were compensated on a percentage basis. Little more analysis is needed
to realize that the lodestar formula also creates a strong incentive for cheap
settlements on the eve of trial, because typically by that point the attorney
has expended the time that determines his compensation and has no reason
to accept the litigation risks incident to going to trial when a larger recovery
2
for the client will not substantially affect his own fee award. '
Why then has the lodestar formula predominated? Various answers can
be given. In some contexts, such as civil rights litigation, there seldom is
any monetary recovery to make a percentage fee system work (or the recoveries are typically too low to produce fees that reflect the public benefits
of the action). Yet this reason cannot explain why the formula is used in
the very different contexts of securities and antitrust litigation, where monetary recoveries are at the heart of the litigation and where the lodestar

18. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for PrivateEnforcement of Law Through Class and DerivativeActions, 86 CoLuM. L.
REv. 669, 686-90 (1986). For an earlier demonstration of this point, see Clermont & Currivan,
supra note 5, at 544; Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in
Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1125, 1136 (1970).
19. The "lodestar formula" was recognized by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), as the prevailing method for the determination of fee awards in fee
shifting cases. But see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984) (indicating that percentage
fee is instead normally to be used in common fund cases). For a fuller explanation of the
lodestar formula's operation, see Leubsdorf, supra note 5, at 477-82. Most recently, in Rivera
v. City of Riverside, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986), the Court rejected use of the percentage fee (or
any rule of proportionality) in a civil rights case, where the fee would be shifted to the defendant.
20. For a fuller discussion of the plaintiff attorney's incentive to delay under the lodestar
formula, see Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, 48 LAw & CoraEMP. PROBS. 5, 33-40 (Summer 1985). While a court can add a
"contingency bonus" or "multiplier" to the time charges under the lodestar formula and this
may reduce the incentive for collusion, the ability of federal courts to award such bonuses has
been sharply limited by a recent Supreme Court decision. See infra note 32.
21. Even if the trial will be an extended one and hence will result in substantial billable
time, the validity of this point is not affected because the same incentive to enter into a cosmetic
settlement will again become strong towards the conclusion of the trial before the judge or
jury reaches its verdict. By definition, there is always a point before judgment at which an
attorney compensated on a time basis has a perverse incentive to settle if there is any chance
of an adverse decision.
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formula can clearly have perverse effects. Here, the key reason for the
lodestar's popularity may reflect the inertial force of legal culture, even in
the face of abundant evidence of inefficiency. Put simply, the legal system
is comfortable with compensating the plaintiff's attorney on an hourly basis
and uncomfortable with a percentage system, because the former system
treats the plaintiff's attorney the same as all other attorneys, while the latter
recognizes that he is in fact a "bounty hunter"-in effect, an independent
entrepreneur. Much can be at least partially explained by positing that the
legal system is unwilling to recognize explicitly that lawyers in some contexts
behave as independent entrepreneurs, and the persistence of the lodestar
formula may owe a great deal to the desire to repress this evident reality.
Because neither client control nor fee formulas seem adequate to minimize
agency costs, there is obviously a strong case for regulation to fill this void.
Viewed in this light, the court in determining the fee award is functioning
essentially as a regulatory body, which-much like a rate-setting public utility
commission-is determining the fair return for the plaintiff's attorney. The
22
court's incentives to monitor, however, are open to serious question.
It would oversimplify to treat the problem of agency costs as uniform.
Although client control in class actions will necessarily be weaker than in
those situations where the client hires the attorney to bring an individual
action, the degree of client control can still vary considerably. In a few
circumstances, the plaintiff class may have a pre-existing relationship and
be sufficiently tightly knit so as to be able to select their own attorney. The
nature of tort injuries suggests, however, that in mass tort cases such client
cohesion will be unusual, because the victims of dangerous products, airplane
accidents, toxic torts or similar events, have little in common but their injury.
In other cases, there may be a pre-existing organization that can represent
the plaintiffs-such as the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the
Sierra Club, and so on. In these instances, a wholly different issue emerges:
who is the principal-the named plaintiffs or the organization? Although a
very different set of potential conflicts can arise in these cases, because the
organization is not always a perfect proxy for the client,23 these conflicts
are largely beyond the scope of this Article.

22. Judge Friendly phrased this point elegantly in his famous remark that "all the dynamics
conduce to judicial approval of settlement" once the adversaries have locked arms and approached the court. Allegheny Corp., 333 F.2d at 347 (Friendly, J., dissenting). Empirical evidence also supports this conclusion. See Rosenfeld, An Empirical Test of Class-Action
Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STu. 113, 119 (1976) (settlement of class action suits tends to result in
monetary bonuses to attorneys at the expense of class interests). Many courts seem to take
their obligation to review the settlement very lightly. See In re Warner Communications Sec.
Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) ("In deciding
whether to approve this settlement proposal, the court starts from the familiar axiom that a
bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.") For a critique of the result in Warner
Communications, see Coffee, supra note 18, at 719 n.134.
23. For example, a recurrent conflict in school desegregation cases arises between the
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In those areas of litigation where agency costs are highest, the practice
has developed that the attorney finds the clients, rather than vice versa. The
extreme case is the derivative action where the client may be a professional
plaintiff who has appeared in literally hundreds of other actions,7 4 or another
attorney (or the pension fund of another law firm) with whom a reciprocal
relationship exists.75 But if this is the limiting case, there are underground
railroads in other areas of litigation (most notably securities litigation) by
which local attorneys direct potential plaintiffs to specialist attorneys in
return for referral fees. Although this pattern is less visible in products
liability and mass disaster cases because the typically more serious and less
predictable injuries in those cases preclude the use of "in-house" clients, it
is noteworthy that even in these true disaster cases the same individuals can
turn up recurrently as lead plaintiffs, even where they do not appear to have
sustained serious injury. 26 Alternatively, the lead counsei may engage, as in
Agent Orange, in a nationwide solicitation for eligible plaintiffs. 27

clients-typically, black parents-and organizations, such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
Sometimes the client group would prefer to accept remedial relief that improves the quality of
education but still preserves the challenged "freedom of choice" concept, while the litigation
firm is committed on ideological grounds to mandatory busing and elimination of all indicia
of past segregation. Cf. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the
Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728 (1986). In these cases, neither group desires to enter
into a cosmetic settlement, but there is a conflict over litigation objectives. To claim as Professor
Gewirtz does that the clients are not entitled to their preference (i.e., financial or ameliorative
relief) is in essence to argue, as this author would, that client objectives should not always
control litigation decisions, even in the settlement context.
24. The legendary case is Harry Lewis, a retired attorney who since 1971 has "filed nearly
100 shareholder actions in Manhattan Federal District Court and close to fifty in state court."
Shereff, The Constant Suitor, MANHATTAN, INC., (May 1986). This figure is just Mr. Lewis's
total for New York. He has also filed "dozens" of actions in Delaware. See Schmidt, Attorneys
Are Often Big Winners When Shareholders Sue Companies, Wall St. J., June 12, 1986,
at 31. See also Marcus, supra note 6, at 474-76 (43 federal class actions by end of 1984 in
which Mr. Lewis was a named plaintiff). Another such example is William Weinberger, who
was reported to have "roughly 30 suits" pending as a plaintiff in June, 1986. Schmidt, supra.
25. See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 259 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff was
attorney whose firm's pension plan invested in takeover target). See also Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) (plaintiffs were trustees of "Tanzer Economic
Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan"). A pension or profit-sharing plan makes a near-perfect
client for a plaintiff's attorney, because its diversified holdings give the attorney ready access
to a broad variety of transactions that he may wish to challenge in the future. An ability to
use its portfolio ends the need to search for an individual client after the fact. Other times,
one plaintiff's attorney may serve as the client for another. See, e.g., Weiss v. Temporary Inv.
Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated, 465 U.S. 1001 (1984). (Mr. Melvyn Weiss,
a well-known plaintiff's attorney in the securities class action field, served as the plaintiff in
this action). Obviously, if reciprocal relationships can be struck, both attorneys profit since
each will have a skillful, experienced client who can hold his own well in depositions.
26. See Stewart, Wake of Disaster:Controversy SurroundsPayments to Plaintiffs in Hyatt
Regency Case, Wall St. J., July 3, 1984, at 1, 12 (noting that plaintiff Deborah Jackson, the
only plaintiff able to establish diversity jurisdiction in the class action growing out of the
collapse of the Hyatt Skywalk in Kansas City, Missouri, was also the plaintiff in the class
action stemming from the MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas, Nevada). This appears to be
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The existence of high agency costs implies the likelihood of "opportunistic
behavior." "Opportunism" is an economic term of art that comprehends
any form of disguised self-seeking behavior. 21 At its simplest, the classic
form of opportunism in class actions is the "sweetheaft" settlement, namely
one in which the plaintiff's attorney trades a high fee award for a low

recovery. However, opportunism also includes subtler behavior, such as
"shirking"-namely, a failure to expend the effort or deliver the services

that a client who was capable of actively monitoring the attorney would
receive. Thus, if the fee formula compensates the attorney on a time basis,
the action may be overstaffed or continued at an interminably desultory
pace (much like Dickens' classic Jarndyce v. Jarndyce29). Finally, another
form of opportunistic behavior may involve linkages between unrelated casessuch as putting aside, or cheaply settling, one case in order to pursue more

lucrative opportunities.
The extent of opportunistic behavior possible in a given litigation context
probably depends on a variety of factors. First, one largely random factor
is the possibility that a few plaintiffs may have suffered disproportionately
large injuries and thus have a sufficient stake in the action to justify expending funds to monitor the attorney. However, these plaintiffs with larger
stakes in the outcome may find it in their own interest to "opt out" of the
class action and pursue individual remedies. Whether they can do so depends
on some highly technical (and much disputed) doctrinal rules.30 Yet, the
an illustration of the curious "underground railroad" by which plaintiff's attorneys can locate
and obtain the services of a valuable plaintiff who can establish standing, diversity jurisdiction,
or some other important element in the case. Mrs. Jackson did not sustain any apparent physical
injury in the Skywalk collapse, but did receive $172,500 in damages. Id. at 1.
27. A fascinating example is that of Victor Yannacone, who initiated the Agent Orange
Litigation. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1301-02 (E.D.N.Y.
1985). Early in the case, Mr. Yannacone travelled across the nation seeking veterans who had
arguably experienced "Agent Orange" related injuries or disabilities, and he entered into
numerous agreements with their local counsel. Id. at 1302, 1335. In this manner he also formed
an "ad hoc" firm ("Yannacone and Associates") to litigate the case. Id. at 1301. See also P.
SCHUCK, AoENT Os a oE ON TRau: MAss Toxic DIsAsaS iN TH Couars 47-52 (1986) (describing efforts of Yannacone to "barnstorm throughout the country"). New patterns of client
solicitation are appearing in other mass tort cases, as plaintiff's attorneys have developed
arrangements with unions and medical clinics to screen and refer potential plaintiffs in return
for paid medical services. See Richards & Meier, Widening Horizons: Lawyers Lead Huntfor
New Groups of Asbestos Victims, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
28. The term has been coined by Yale economist Oliver Williamson to include behavior
that amounts to "self interest seeking with guile," whether or not fraudulent by traditional
legal criteria. See Williamson, The Modern Corporation:Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J.
EcoN. Lrr. 1537, 1545 & n.12 (1981).
29. In Charles Dicken's Bleak House an action captioned Jarndyce v. Jarndyce continued
for decades until the trust estate at issue was exhausted by legal fees.
30. Essentially, the plaintiff may opt out from a class action unless it is a mandatory class
action under Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the debate over the
scope of Rule 23(b)(1), see Note, supra note 12, at 1153-59 and infra notes 53-62 and accompanying
text.
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immediate point is that an inability to "opt out" may reduce the opportunistic behavior to which those other plaintiffs who have sustained relatively
small injuries would be subjected, because these plaintiffs can now "free
ride" on the monitoring efforts of those plaintiffs who have a larger stake
in the outcome. By the same token, however, "opting out" protects the
client with a substantial stake who fears that he cannot monitor the class's
lead counsel as efficiently as he can monitor his own attorney in an individual
action. To the extent that "opting out" has been more restricted in some
specific litigation contexts (such as "mass accident" cases), then we might
hypothesize that less opportunistic behavior might be visible in these contexts.
A second factor determining the magnitude of agency costs is the degree
of cohesion and prior association among the plaintiff's attorneys who become
involved in a particular case. There is a world of difference between an
antitrust class action in which a dozen antitrust specialists appear, who are
all well known to each other, and a products liability class action in which
the plaintiffs are represented by a hundred or more plaintiff's attorneys,
who neither know each other nor have had much prior exposure to complex
civil litigation in the federal courts. In the former case, all the preconditions
for collusion are satisfied. That is, because the process by which a cheap
settlement can be exchanged for a high fee award necessarily involves at
least a tacit understanding Within the plaintiff's attorneys' camp, such an
agreement can most easily develop among "repeat players" Who know and
can trust each other. In contrast, an action in which there are one hundred
or more attorneys who are basically strangers to each other implies chaos.
Inefficiency may be inevitable under such circumstances, but collusion is
less likely. The large number of participants ensures that there are likely to
be objectors. More generally, the process of fashioning a settlement that
maximizes the attorneys' self-interest, but not the clients', is a delicate one
in which euphemisms and code words play an important role. Obviously,
in some litigation contexts, the plaintiff's attorneys may have pre-existing
relationships with their clients, but this is unlikely in the highly specialized
world of plaintiff's antitrust or securities class action litigation. Absent such
a prior relationship, the potential for opportunistic behavior is enhanced.
These reasons may at least partially explain why cosmetic settlements tend
to be a more pervasive problem in derivative actions and3 securities class
actions than in product liability or mass tort class actions. 1

31. Of course, another factor involves the ease with which derivative and securities class

actions can often be settled on the basis of non-pecuniary relief, such as revised disclosures,
changed corporate procedures or board structures, or injunctive relief of limited value (because
the issue has become moot). For a discussion of this problem of cosmetic settlements, see
Coffee, supra note 20, at 23-33. To date, this problem has not yet arisen in mass tort cases,
but I can see it arising in the future. By agreeing to provide generalized "disaster relief," or
promising to deliver future medical care or other services of indeterminate value, a defendant
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B. Asymmetric Stakes
In most litigation (as in poker), one side's winnings are the other side's
losses; the stakes are thus equal, absent special factors. However, once we
recognize that the attorney is often an independent entrepreneur in class
action litigation, then it follows that in these instances the operative litigation
stakes will be unequal. The defendants have at stake their potential liability
plus their legal expenses, while the stake for the plaintiffs attorneys is
essentially their expected fee award (minus their costs). A number of empirical
surveys have shown that the fee award in most class action litigation tends
to be a decreasing function of the recovery and typically averages between
20% and 30% of the recovery (and then declines further once the judgment
enters the multi-million dollar range).3 2 This pattern seems to hold true,
whatever the fee formula used. As a result, this 20% to 30% benchmark
range for fee awards means that in a litigation where the defendant sees the
expected loss to be $1,000,000 plus litigation expenses, the plaintiffs attorney
sees an expected recovery of at most $200,000 to $300,000 (minus those costs
that will not be separately reimbursed). This asymmetry in the litigation
stakes can have profound consequences on the willingness of the parties to
expend funds on the action. Rationally, the defendants in the foregoing
may be able to strike a deal with a less than zealous plaintiff's attorney that follows the familiar
script of a cheap settlement in return for a high plaintiff's fee award. For example, in a Bhopaltype case, some highly visible assistance might be traded off against a much greater reduction
in financial liability. That such deals have not yet been brokered in the mass tort field may
owe more to the novelty of mass disaster litigation than to the higher standards of the personnel
in this field.
32. Empirical surveys of class actions have recurrently reported statistics irr the 20% to
30% range, whatever the fee formula used. See Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class
Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. Coas. L. 267, 334-38, 345-47 (1978); Cole, Counsel Fees in
Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions-HornsteinRevisited, 6 U. RicH. L. Ray. 259, 27375, 281 (1972) (fee awards average 200o and decline as recoveries increase). See also Warner
Communications, 618 F. Supp. at 749-50 (reviewing all recent fee awards in the Second Circuit
securities class actions and arriving at 20% to 30% figure); S. Salop & L. White, Private
Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework (Sept. 1985) (unpublished paper) (finding
plaintiff's fee awards to average 20.2% of the total recovery in antitrust cases in non-MultiDistrict cases, but to fall to 8.3% in the typically much larger Multi-District cases). As a result,
if within a specific litigation context, a fee of between 25% to 30% is expected based on past
experience, we still have in effect a de facto percentage of the recovery system, except that
there is a strong incentive to delay until sufficient time has been expended.
This seeming equivalence between the lodestar and the percentage of the recovery formula
may not last much longer, however, because it was probably achieved by intelligent judicial
manipulation of the "multiplier" or "contingency factor" that could be added to the time
charges under the lodestar formula. See Leubsdorf, supra note 5. In Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986), the Supreme Court sharply
curtailed the ability of federal courts to add such bonuses onto the time charges and thus may
have ended the rough equivalence of these two fee formulas. In light of Delaware Valley, I
think those commentators who continue to support the lodestar formula have not focused
adequately on its recent eclipse. See Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 584 n.89 (1987).
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action would spend up to $999,999 to avert the $1,000,000 expected loss,
but the plaintiff's attorney will not be willing to invest more than $299,999
to earn an expected fee of $300,000. Of course, if the plaintiffs are successful,
some of their litigation expenses will be reimbursed in addition to the fee
award, but their major expense-the opportunity cost of their time and
effort-is bounded by the expected fee award.
While this asymmetry is probably inherent in the concept of a contingent
fee, it is aggravated by judicial regulation. Absent judicial prohibitions, an
individual client might strike a bargain with his attorney under which the
fee was wholly contingent but could amount to 99% of the recovery. This
would be no more irrational than a defendant paying $99 in legal expenses
to avert a $100 loss. But because courts understandably do not believe that
meaningful bargaining can occur between a lead counsel and a dispersed
plaintiff's class, they have established their own fee formulas, which "protect" the class by denying them the ability to enter into "expensive" contracts
for legal services. 33 Although such paternalism is both fully understandable
and to a degree justified, its consequence is to permit the defendants to
purchase more costly legal services than can the plaintiffs, thereby eroding
the deterrent potential of private law enforcement.
The bottom line is evident: at least in a significant number of cases, we
should expect the defendant's side to be willing to litigate more vigorously,
expend more resources, pursue more collateral matters, and in general to
seek to exploit this differential in their relative willingness to invest in the
action by attempting to raise the "ante" at each stage of the litigation. Of
course, there are limits on this advantage, both because the plaintiff's costs
may be less than the defendant's and because the expected fee awarded
could be large enough to justify whatever costs that the defendant's dilatory
intransigence can impose on the plaintiff. In principle, the plaintiff's attorney
will focus on the margin between the expected fee and his expected costs.
In all likelihood, the plaintiff's costs do not rise as a constant function of
the amount of the damages sought; some point of diminishing marginal
returns from further investment must be reached. Thus, at least in the class
action for very high damages, asymmetric stakes may be less of a factor.
In such cases, the defendant cannot realistically threaten to raise the plaintiffs attorney's costs in such a manner as to erode the expected return to
a level that does not adequately compensate the plaintiff's attorney for the
risk assumed. Where this point lies, however, is largely indeterminate.

33. Rather than this paternalistic approach, we might adopt, as I have elsewhere suggested,
the use of an increasing percentage-of-the-recovery formula. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 696-

97.
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C.

The Cost Differential

It cannot be assumed that litigation is equally costly to both sides, and
this factor may offset the above-noted impact of asymmetric litigation stakes.
Professors Rosenberg and Shavell have offered a formal model of the nuisance suit that depends upon the plaintiffs being able to exploit a significant
cost differential 4 That is, if the plaintiffs know that by spending $10,000,
they can cause the defendants to spend $100,000 to have the action dismissed,
this 10:1 cost differential gives the action a settlement value even if it is
frivolous. Much about the nature of civil discovery corroborates the possible
existence of such a differential.5 For example, it is far simpler to demand
that the defendant identify and furnish all documents, memoranda, letters
and conversations conceivably pertaining to a particular subject matter over
a multi-year period than it is to comply with such a demand. Compliance
may require the defendant's attorney to sort through musty storehouses of
records, where each single file drawer searched may consume an hour or
more of expensive legal time. Depositions similarly take substantial time for
preparation of the deponent that may easily exceed the time expended in
the deposition by the plaintiff's attorney. Of course, the fact that discovery
can be used to punish an adversary does not alone imply a cost differential,
because defendants can in turn seek discovery of plaintiffs and their witnesses. Yet, in most class action litigation, there is relatively little to be
learned from the lead plaintiff. Although the plaintiff's adequacy to serve
as the representative of the class can be challenged, this is usually a fairly
perfunctory inquiry. 6 In the typical securities class action, there is no real
issue that the plaintiff bought the securities whose value is at issue; nor in
the typical toxic tort case is there much doubt that the plaintiff suffered an
injury. The extent of this injury is not at this point especially relevant.
Still, there are problems with the cost differential thesis if it is used as a
starting point for policy analysis. For example, if both sides are relying on
expert witnesses, each would appear roughly equally vulnerable to discovery
abuse with no clear cost advantage favoring the plaintiffs. Of course, defense
attorneys may claim that plaintiff's attorneys typically employ fewer and

34. Rosenberg & Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value,
5 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 3 (1985).
35. In Agent Orange, for example, the defendants' litigation costs amounted to approximately $75 million dollars. See Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALI. L. REv.
555, 598 (1985). Plaintiffs, in contrast, had considerable difficulty in raising $1.25 million to
finance their litigation.
36. Recent decisions have tended to view skeptically the defendant's claim that some asserted
conflict of interest renders the lead plaintiff incapable of providing effective representation for
the class. See, e.g., Tyco Laboratories Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp. 292, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Shamrock Associates v. Horizon Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), § 92, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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less costly witnesses, and some defense attorneys have argued to this author
that plaintiff's attorneys tend to be low budget operators who have little
overhead and low opportunity costs. As a generalization, this may have
some validity, but what does it prove? Put simply, a litigation cost differential
may be less a cause than an effect; that is, the consequence of asymmetric
litigation stakes may make the plaintiff's attorney less prepared to invest in
the action than is his adversary. For example, in an action where the defendants realistically are exposed to a $1,000,000 loss, but the expected fee award
is unlikely to exceed $300,000, it certainly should be expected that the
defendants will expend more resources on expert witnesses, deposition preparation, discovery, and associated expenses. Given the imbalance in expected
payoffs, a rational strategy for the profit-maximizing plaintiff's attorney
may be to engage in what amounts to "feigned" litigation-that is, to create
and exploit a cost differential by making broad discovery requests, scheduling
numerous depositions, and otherwise seeking to maximize the costs that
defendants will incur without, himself, preparing intensively for trial. Sometimes, the plaintiff's attorney's ability to exploit this cost differential will
be abetted by the defendant's attorney, whose own self-interest leads him
to prepare prodigiously and bill accordingly. Hence, the plaintiff's attorney
may subpoena crates of files and documents, which the defendant's attorney
will zealously review for privileged information and release only after costly
skirmishing, but which the plaintiff's attorney may inspect only cursorily.
In principle, it may be enough for the plaintiff's purposes that the defendants
know that he possesses potentially damaging information.
This strategy of low-intensity litigation may allow the plaintiff's attorney
to maintain contemporaneously a sizable portfolio of actions, while exploiting
the cost differential so that settlement becomes less costly to the defendants
than a total victory. There are, of course, limits to the plaintiff's attorney's
ability to exploit this cost differential. Obviously, the plaintiffs attorney
must possess credibility, and this probably requires some past litigated victories. Thus, the plaintiff's attorney has a strong, but not constant, incentive
to invest in developing a reputation. But, once acquired, such human capital
can be made to earn a return, much as any other asset, and the plaintiffs
attorney who is seen as a formidable antagonist can exploit his reputation
without expending significant effort on a particular case. In effect, he becomes a "repeat player" who is confronting a defendant who has not
previously experienced major high stakes litigation and is therefore probably
more risk-averse. In this confrontation, the inexperienced defendant, who
may face a potentially catastrophic loss, can typically be convinced by his
own attorneys to expend substantial amounts on preparing an "airtight"
defense. One side then may be over-investing and the other side underinvesting, in terms of what fully informed and experienced clients would do
if agency costs were lower on both sides. If the action is stretched out long
enough (which under the lodestar formula is in the mutual interest of both
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groups of attorneys), risk-averse defendants may eventually recognize that
a settlement would be less costly than continued litigation, even though the
odds at trial are heavily in their favor. This scenario depends upon the
defendants being unable to minimize costs, and thus it does not apply as
well to "repeat players" (such as insurance companies) who may deem it
in their strategic interest to develop their own reputation for toughness by
fighting to a litigated resolution.
The foregoing analysis suggests that what appears to be a significant cost
differential favoring the plaintiffs may be the composite of several interrelated factors. First, plaintiffs may litigate more cheaply simply because they
have to. Asymmetric stakes necessitate that the plaintiff's attorney, as an
independent entrepreneur, minimize costs, while defense attorneys can persuade their more nervous clients to litigate according to a more luxurious
style. Closely related to this first possibility is a second that by trying to
increase the ante, defendants may be seeking to exploit the asymmetric stakes
factor and the plaintiff's attorneys are responding by engaging in low cost
"feigned" litigation that gives the action the appearance of being a frivolous
one. Even if defendants cannot force the plaintiff's side to match their
expenditures dollar for dollar, they may still be able to demonstrate to
plaintiffs their ability to make protracted litigation unprofitable for the
plaintiffs because the expected fee recovery will not cover the plaintiff's
attorneys' opportunity costs. Still a third possibility is that risk-neutral plaintiff's attorneys can manage a portfolio of individual actions according to a
low intensity litigation strategy, hoping either to identify a risk-averse defendant who will settle on a basis more generous than the litigation odds would
dictate, or to discover a "smoking gun" that changes the litigation odds
after only a limited search. Finally, there is the original possibility that a
litigation cost differential does give the plaintiff's attorney a license to commit
extortion. This advantage seems likely to fade over the course of the litigation, however, because, as the defendants expend resources to prepare for
trial, the plaintiff's leverage declines. This is because rational defendants
will disregard sunk costs and focus only on marginal costs. Thus, each dollar
the defendants expend reduces the future litigation expenses to which the
plaintiffs can expose them. In addition, each dollar the plaintiff's attorney
spends brings him closer to the point at which his own costs will exceed the
expected fee award.
On a practical level, it seems likely that the significance of both the cost
differential and the asymmetric stakes factors will decline in the context of
very large class actions. There are obviously limits on the ability of one
party to effect the outcome of the litigation, or the expenditures that the
other party must make, by itself expending resources. In this realm of the
very large class action, the next factor considered may have the greatest
significance.
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Inter-plaintiffCompetition and the Common Pool Problem

A large class action may involve one hundred or more plaintiff's attorneys.1 7 Either individually or in smaller groups, they may have filed class
or individual actions in various district courts across the nation, often piggybacking on an earlier commenced action brought by public authorities
that in effect signalled the existence of this cause of action. These actions
are then consolidated in a single district court by the Judicial Panel on
Multi-District Litigation, technically for pre-trial proceedings, but in reality
typically for trial as well . 3 s The result is an unstable caucus that is expected
to function as an "ad hoc law firm." Until recently, the Manual on Complex
Litigation instructed the trial court to let the plaintiff's attorneys elect their
own lead counsel. 39 The result was sometimes to provoke the equivalent of
an unsupervised political convention without a rules or credentials committee.
Rival slates would be formed, other attorneys invited into the action in order
to secure their vote for lead counsel, and eventually a political compromise
struck. 40 The obvious result tended to be both overstaffing and an inability
to eliminate the free-riding or marginally competent attorney, whose vote
gave him a leverage that his ability did not. Less obvious but potentially
more important is the corrosive impact of this system on the plaintiff's
attorney's willingness to search out actionable legal violations. This incentive
to search is dulled because the attorney who discovers an actionable legal
violation may have to share the expected reward with those other attorneys
who later file parallel class actions and are typically then consolidated into
a single nationwide proceeding. The first attorney is thus like a prospector

37. For a list of recent class actions in the antitrust field where the number of plaintiff's
attorneys has approached or exceeded 100 attorneys, see Coffee, Rescuing the PrivateAttorney
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv.
215, 223 n.17 (1983). The number of attorneys is likely to be even higher in mass tort cases
involving widely distributed products such as asbestos or the Dalkon Shield. In the Agent
Orange litigation, some 600 individual cases were consolidated before Judge Weinstein. See
"Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1301.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976). For a discussion of the procedures followed by the
Judicial Panel, see Note, The JudicialPanel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87
HALv. L. REv. 1001, 1017 (1974) (noting failure to remand cases to original district court following pretrial proceedings).
39. See MANuAL FOR ComFLax LTGATION § 1.92 (5th ed. 1981) (advising trial court not to
itself select lead counsel for class but to request that plaintiff's attorneys select such counsel).
More recently, this phrasing has been changed to give the judge authority to select counsel.
See MANUAL FOR CoMPLax LrTIAON, SECOND § 20.224 (1985). However, the court is still
advised "to give special consideration to the suggestions of counsel" in determining an attorney's
role in a class action. Id. Lead counsel, however chosen, is also expected to make litigation
decisions based upon "consensus." Id. at § 20.222. "Consensus" is in many respects simply
a more delicate word for majority vote.
40. For a detailed examination of this process, see Coffee, supra note 37, at 248-61. See
also In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
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who cannot stake out a legally valid claim on his discovery, and thus his
incentive is to exploit the newly discovered resource quickly by reaching an
early settlement (if he can) before others intervene. As a practical consequence, the private attorney general concept operates today largely by piggybacking on the earlier efforts of governmental enforcers, because this
strategy minimizes search costs, on which the attorney will not expend funds,
given the legal insecurity of such an investment. Only the mass disaster and
products liability contexts stand as major exceptions to this generalization,
because in these areas the attorney need not incur extensive search costs as
either the event has been widely publicized or the client is aware of the
injury.
On a more abstract level, the pattern described above represents an example
of a "common pool" problem. 41 Such problems arise whenever there is
difficulty in identifying or asserting property rights over an asset or resource.
Here, that asset is the expected fee award. Given the ambiguities in the law
and the substantial discretion accorded the court, uncertainty over who will
control the action and thus be able to claim the greater share of the fee
award inhibits the rationally entrepreneurial attorney from making substantial expenditures on search costs. Classically, the answer to this problem is
to allocate the property right in question so as to establish clear and enforceable entitlements. The substantial obstacles to implementing this prescription by clearly according ownership of the action to one attorney (or
one firm) have been explored by this author elsewhere.42 Suffice it here to
say that however crude it may seem to favor the first attorney to file an
action, this approach creates appropriate incentives from an ex ante perspective (although it also encourages hastily filed, under-prepared actions).
Still, even if a system that properly rewards the attorney who incurs search
costs seems out of reach, a variety of means are possible to reduce destructive
inter-plaintiff competition over control of the action. Today, this competition
take two basic forms. First, there is the usual struggle over the selection of
lead counsel and the membership of the steering committee that controls the
action's management. While some jockeying for position by plaintiff's attorneys is probably inevitable and may even enhance the court's ability to
choose, the policy objective here should be to encourage greater hierarchical
control within the "ad hoc" firm so that the lead counsel, once selected,
41. For a standard discussion of this problem, see Sweeney, Tollison & Willett, Market
Failure, The Common-Pool Problem and Ocean Resource Exploitation, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 179
(1974). Classically, common pool problems arise with resources such as oil, where individual
owners of drilling rights that tap into the same resource will have an incentive to compete to
withdraw the resource even though the value of the resource could be maximized by a different
strategy. The standard solution to a common pool problem is "compulsory unitization"-a
result that parallels the law's discovery of the class action as an alternative to competitive
individual actions.
42. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 77-79.
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does not find it necessary to negotiate with various constituencies to remain
in power or to award them patronage in the form of work assignments. An
efficient structure requires that plaintiff's lead counsel be able to prune the
deadwood from the "ad hoc" firm and employ only those whose ability he
respects. The second form of inter-plaintiff competition involves "optingout." Today, it commonly happens that the losers in the struggle for lead
counsel designation or steering committee membership simply opt out and
pursue their claims in either state court or "tag-along" individual actions in
federal court. Alternatively, plaintiff's attorneys may oppose class certification or file a state action before certification is granted. Another economic
motive also underlies "opting out": typically, the plaintiff's attorney can
expect a higher fee award from pursuing an individual action on a contingent
43
fee basis than from remaining in a subordinate position in the class action.
Understandable as this pattern is, its unfortunate consequence is both to
multiply the public costs of the action and to produce a rush to judgment,
because plaintiffs in the various individual actions have to fear the potentially
preclusive or otherwise damaging effect of a settlement in the class action.
Even more important, defendants may be able to exploit this inter-plaintiff
competition by seeking to bring the weaker individual cases to trial ahead
of the class action in order to create unfavorable precedents and gain settlement leverage." Finally, opting-out, if it occurs on a large enough scale,
may seriously complicate the settlement of the class action; indeed, if the
defendant's assets appear insufficient, it may also give rise to a "prisoner's
dilemma" problem that Part II discusses in more detail. To alleviate these
problems, some federal courts have begun to restrict opting-out by expanding
a doctrine known as the "limited fund" theory in order to make the action
a mandatory class action. 45 These decisions are controversial and will be

43. Contingent fee awards in mass disaster cases often reach 40% of the recovery. See
Note, supra note 12, at 1148; Craft, FactorsInfluencing Settlement of PersonalInjury and
Death Claims in Aircraft Accident Litigation, 46 J. An. L. & COM., 895, 919 (1981). For
example, in the Agent Orange Litigation, at least one attorney had a 50% contingent fee
arrangement with his clients. 611 F. Supp. at 1316. In contrast, if the class action is a large
one (say fifty attorneys or more), it is inevitable that some attorneys who filed class or individual
actions that were consolidated will be excluded from the plaintiff's team and denied any realistic
opportunity to participate. In the Agent Orange litigation, this was the fate of approximately
100 attorneys who, although having private clients, were not employed by the plaintiff's
management committee and received no fee award as a result. Id. at 1318, 1338. Inevitably in
any large class action, there will be such losers, and, from an ex ante perspective, it is predictable
that they will seek to opt out.
44. For a similar view that defendants will seek to bring the weaker cases to trial first, see
Note, supra note 12, at 1148.
45. If there is a "limited fund" out of which the recovery will be satisfied, the advisory
committee's note to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specially notes that this
factor justifies certification of a Rule 23(b)(1) "mandatory" class action from which the
plaintiffs may not opt out. See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1961); Note,
supra note 12, at 1157-58. In some mass disaster cases courts have been prepared to certify a
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discussed further in Part II. For the present, particularly in the mass tort
cases, the current prospect is for continuing chaos.

E. An Initial Summary
General as the considerations discussed above have been, they do in
common point toward some policy objectives. Most fundamentally, if agency
costs are to be reduced, the most effective monitor is likely to be the plaintiff
having the largest stake in the action. Of course, no such client may exist
with a large enough stake to be effective, but where they are present, "high
stake" plaintiffs, much like the large shareholder in the corporate setting,
are likely to be the most effective monitors, because they are more likely
to expend time and effort in supervising the plaintiff's attorneys. Yet, the
"entrepreneurial" attorney has little desire to represent such an active, concerned client and, at least in theory, should prefer a more passive client less
able or willing to monitor him. This is one of a number of reasons why the
6
4
"high stakes" plaintiff may be disadvantaged in class actions.
This line of analysis has two further implications. First, because it is the
plaintiff who has the largest stake in the action who is most likely to opt

out of the class action, when we restrict the plaintiff's ability to opt out we

ensure that the most effective monitor will remain on duty-admittedly at
a possible cost in fairness to the party. To be sure, the largest stakeholder
may still be dwarfed by the overall size of the action, but in many instances
relatively modest expenditures by such a client might substantially reduce
opportunistic behavior by the plaintiff's attorneys. Second, because the larg-

est stakeholder in the action is more likely to control opportunistic behavior
by his own attorney, this conclusion suggests in turn that, other things being

relatively equal, the court should designate the attorney of one of the largest
stakeholders as the lead counsel. For example, in an antitrust class action,
if the choice for lead counsel were between: (1)
a prominent antitrust litigator
with a well-known reputation (in other words, the equivalent of a Melvin
Rule 23(b)(1) class action based on the judgment that the defendant's solvency would be seriously
challenged. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 725 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), petition for mandamus denied, 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067
(1984). But see In *re"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied sub. nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). One recent
decision has required detailed fact findings to support the conclusion that a limited fund would
exist and reversed a Rule 23(b)(1) certification in the absence thereof. See In re Bendectin Prod.
Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1984). At present, courts appear divided between
those that require the proponents of class certification to show that a limited fund will "necessarily" affect the plaintiff's claim, "Dalkon Shield, " 693 F.2d at 852, and those that require
only that a "substantial probability" exists, "Agent Orange," 100 F.R.D. at 726.
46. This theme, which is addressed more fully in the next section of this Article, may also
explain the frequent appearance of seemingly professional plaintiffs who have minimal stakes
in the action. See supra notes 24-26.
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Belli in the torts field) but with a relatively minor client whose claimed
injury did not exceed $100,000; and (2) another experienced, competent
attorney who had been retained by a large client (such as an association of
hospitals whose claimed damages involve millions as the result of overpayments for drugs caused by a price-fixing conspiracy), this suggested rule
would point toward the latter candidate-regardless of the results of any
election among the plaintiff's attorneys.
Although constraining the plaintiff's ability to opt out reduces the problem
of inter-plaintiff competition and the rush to judgment, it does so at a
.probable cost in terms of fairness to the largest plaintiffs who often feel
that the class action subordinates their interests to those of the average class
member. In this light, preferring the attorneys for the largest plaintiff in
the selection of the lead counsel represents a less drastic step that may induce
the client not to opt out. Thus, the choice of lead counsel should be viewed
not only in terms of the relative skill of the contending attorneys, but also
in terms of the impact of a given choice on the rate of opting out and the
need for effective monitoring.
II.

MODELS OF THE CLASS ACTION: "BUREAUCRATIC

"INDIVIDUAL

JUSTICE,"

JUSTICE" AND "RATIONAL ACTOR"

Once upon a time civil procedure teachers simply sought to explicate the
scope and meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but today a
new generation has begun to offer coherent, integrated models of how a
system of civil procedure should operate. An outstanding example is Professor David Rosenberg, whose work is guided by a "public law" vision of
the tort system.47 Although others have expressed reservations about this
proposal because they fear his explicit subordination of the interests of the
individual client would fundamentally distort our system of procedural justice, 48 my reservations are of a different character. 'While I share his attraction
to public law norms that emphasize the deterrent role of the civil law, I will
outline in this section the critical junctures where, I believe, his vision does
not examine critically enough the incentives and disincentives that it creates
for the legal entrepreneurs who predictably will come to the fore under such
a new order. At the outset, it must be underscored that the "rational actor"
perspective that I adopt is in no sense a statement of normative values. I
do not assume that lawyers should behave as utility-maximizing entrepreneurs, but only that in a world of high agency and information costs lawyers
typically will do so. My purpose is not to debunk any set of normative

47. In addition to Professor Rosenberg's Article in this Symposium, see Rosenberg, supra
note 12.
48. See, e.g., Transgrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CoRNEuL L. REv.
779 (1985); Miller & Crump, supra note 12, at 54-55.
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values-either those underlying a "public law" approach or those espoused
by adherents of individual justice-but to examine the likely consequences
of proposed mechanisms for implementing normative visions.
Professor Rosenberg's vision of a "bureaucratic system of tort law" leads
him to make two central policy proposals: (1) mandatory classing; and (2)

damage averaging. Each will be examined separately, but in overview, under
his first proposal, the ability of the individual plaintiff to opt out and pursue

a private damages action remedy would be sharply curtailed or eliminated,
and, under the second, the court would impose "damage schedules based
in principle on the average loss suffered by members of the class or subclass."

49

This averaging procedure is justified chiefly on the grounds of cost

efficiency in order to eliminate "the costs of redundant, de novo, particularized adjudication. ' 50 Mandatory classing can also be justified on this
ground as well as on two independent grounds. First, a disaggregated process
of individual lawsuits is likely to produce a sub-optimal result from the
plaintiffs' perspective because of substantial "free-rider" problems. Standard
economic theory suggests that no individual plaintiff (or attorney) will have
an adequate incentive to .develop information and data or to litigate as
aggressively as would all the plaintiffs collectively." Second, the defendant
can exploit a case-by-case linear processing of mass tort cases, both by
litigating weaker cases first and by creating a rush to settlement.

These claims have logic and force. Yet, they leave unresolved an important
anomaly: plaintiffs appear to be opposing the certification of mandatory

class actions, while defendants regularly favor it.52 This paradoxical fact

49. Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 570.
50. Id. at 564.
51. "Free-rider" problems will arise any time some of the plaintiffs can hope to benefit
from the discovery and other litigation work done by earlier plaintiffs without having to bear
their full share of these costs. For a discussion of the "free rider" problem as a cause of suboptimal allocation of resources, see J. HiRsCMLER, PRiCE THEORY AND APPLICATION 537-38,
561-64 (2d ed. 1980); R. PosNR, EcoNomc ANALYsis OF LAW 45-46 (2d ed. 1977). Although

the plaintiffs can contract to share these costs, this process is costly when the plaintiffs are
dispersed and largely uninformed about their legal rights. A mandatory class action reduces or
eliminates these costs by establishing an organizational structure to administer the action in
lieu of market negotiations among dispersed plaintiff's attorneys. See supra note 37.
On a less theoretical level, small plaintiffs lack the economic resources to undertake massive
litigation, such as those involved in mass tort cases. In In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1067 (1984), Judge Jack Weinstein noted that "it is doubtful if a single plaintiff
represented by a single attorney pursuing an individual action could ever succeed."
52. For example, in In re Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, (N.D.
Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) cert. denied sub nom. A.H.
Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983), it was the defendant, A.H. Robins, the manufacturer
of the product, who sought mandatory class certification. Id. at 895. Ideally defendants would
prefer to certify a mandatory class action for settlement purposes; this procedural innovation
assures them immunity from future claims relating to the same subject and spares them the
uncertainty surrounding a judge's or jury's determination of damages. See In re "Bendectin"
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should caution those who favor mandatory classing. Put simply, if Brer'
Rabbit wants to be thrown into the briar patch, there is something about
the briar patch that proponents of the public law model may not understand.
Again, this suggests the centrality of an incentives-based inquiry, which this
section will next undertake.

A.

Mandatory Classing: Whose Ox is Gored?

Proponents of mass tort reform have succeeded in convincing some courts
to accept a "constructive bankruptcy" theory under which the likely insuf-

ficiency of the defendant's assets in comparison with the financial recovery
sought justifies deeming the corporation itself to be a "limited fund" and
hence certifying the action as a mandatory class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).5 3
Essentially, this conclusion means that the plaintiffs may not opt out and

will be bound by the judgment or settlement. While more courts ultimately
have rejected this theory than have accepted it5 4 I will leave any exploration
of its doctrinal foundations to the teachers of civil procedure and focus

instead on its incentive effects.
The opposition of plaintiff's attorneys to mandatory class action is easily
understood, because it exposes them to two distinct losses. First, contingency

fees in personal injury actions often equal (or exceed) 40% of the recovery,
while in the class action there is judicial supervision of the fee award and
typically a lower fee will be awarded in terms of a percentage of the recovery. 55 Moreover, for an attorney who represents multiple plaintiffs, the
same contingency fee may be charged to each, even though there are ob-

viously economies of scale and in a competitive market the attorney would
reduce his price as his marginal cost per plaintiff decreased. In contrast, the

Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio), rev'd, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984). In the
"Bendectin" case, opposition to this procedure came from within the plaintiffs' attorneys'
camp. 749 F.2d at 302 n.3. For the view that plaintiff's attorneys now often resist class
certification on the grounds that it favors the defendants, see Wagner, The New Elite Plaintiffs'
Bar, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1986, at 48 (quoting Thomas Henderson, a member of the plaintiff's
management committee in the "Agent Orange" case). Interestingly, in the "Agent Orange"
case, it was the defendants who first sought to consolidate the actions. P. Scfuc:, supra note
27. Most recently, in In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1984),
vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1986), the principal defendants accepted mandatory class
certification, which was opposed by many plaintiffs. See Miller & Crump, supra note 12, at
40 n.354.
53. See "Dalkon Shield," 526 F. Supp. at 897-99. For a review of this theory and the
critical reception it has received from appellate courts, see Miller & Crump, supra note 12, at
42, 46-48.
54. See In re "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d
300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Miller & Crump, supra note 12, at 46-48. But see In re
"Agent Orangeo" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), petition for mandamus denied, 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
55. See supra note 43.
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attorney in a class action will typically be compensated under the "lodestar
formula," which looks to the hours he has reasonably expended on the
action. The attorney thus faces greater uncertainty, because he does not
know in advance how much time the court will deem to have been reasonably
expended. Nor does he gain much by representing multiple plaintiffs, because
little additional time can be justified to the court on this basis.
Another economic loss that the mandatory class action poses for plaintiff's
attorneys involves the number of attorneys who can participate in the action.
In a mass tort action, there can conceivably be thousands of claimants, and
each may have his own individual attorney. In the aggregate, the result is
overstaffing and excessive legal fees. In contrast, once control of the class
action is awarded to a judicially selected steering committee (which seldom
has more than a dozen or so members), that committee has full control of
the action and no incentive to overstaff it. Typically, those not given a seat
on the steering committee will have only a limited involvement in the action
and will be unable to obtain substantial fee awards, because the committee
56
will control work assignments.
Although both these factors-the lower fee formula and the reduction in
staffing-explain why plaintiff's attorneys do not like mandatory class actions, they do not tell us why sophisticated defendants seek class certification.
After all, the plaintiff's attorney's loss is logically his client's gain, not the
defendant's.
Why then do defendants seek class certification in mass tort cases? Several
different answers can be given. First, the transition from multiple individual
actions to a class action also involves a transition from contingent percentage
fee to a "lodestar" or time-based fee formula. With the use of the latter
formula comes a heightened prospect of a collusive settlement. Once the
plaintiff's attorney expends substantial time on the action (or simply is in
a position to claim that he has), a basic conflict arises between him and his
client, because the attorney's fee award is largely divorced from his success
and is, within limits, relatively constant whether he settles at a high or low
figure. By settling, the attorney avoids the usually substantial risk of an
adverse judgment. The net result is one that I have elsewhere termed "structural collusion." '57 While no honest defendant's attorney would offer to
exchange a low settlement for a high fee award (nor would a responsible
plaintiff's attorney accept such an offer, if made), neither has to offer any

56. A representative example is supplied by the "Agent Orange" litigation. There some one

hundred attorneys who had individual clients but were not employed by the plaintiffs management committee received no fee award from the court. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1318, 1338 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Increasingly, to prevent overstaffing
and duplicative work, courts are indicating at the outset of a class action that they will only

compensate a limited number of attorneys for work done under the direction of the plaintiff's
steering committee. See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
57. Coffee, supra note 20, at 23-33.
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such "bribe," because the legal rules applicable to class actions essentially
do it for them. Once sufficient time has been expended to justify the expected
fee, the parties can reach a settlement that is below the action's litigation
value without the need for any actual or implicit agreement that links the
fee to the settlement. Add to this factor the generally higher agency costs
applicable to class actions (where plaintiffs are dispersed and seldom have
a close relationship with their attorney), and an initial reason for the defendant's preference for class actions becomes evident: it may be able to settle
the action more cheaply and with less uncertainty than when faced with a
proliferation of individual actions in which attorneys are compensated on a
percentage basis.
A second (and, I believe, more fundamental) reason for the defendant's
preference concerns the behavior of the legal decision-maker (typically, a
jury). One aspect of this problem involves punitive damages. If the defendant
must face multiple juries and each wishes to punish it for conduct that it
considers shocking and reprehensible (such as the deliberate suppression of
a serious health hazard to workers or consumers), the net result may be
astronomic damages far beyond that which any single decision-maker would
impose. In part, this is the familiar problem of the tyranny of small decisions,
and defendants who elect class certification probably perceive that a single
decision-maker would be more moderate. Possibly for this reason and also
because the early recipients of punitive damages may bankrupt the firm and
so deprive later plaintiffs of any damages, some courts in mass tort cases
have certified mandatory class actions for punitive damages.5 8 Still, although
much attention has focused on punitive damages, it is only the proverbial
tip of a legal iceberg that involves a much larger problem.
The central problem, which defendants may recognize (but which legal
scholars have largely ignored), starts from the tendency of the legal decisionmaker (and especially the jury) to behave in a manner that is as much
retributive as compensatory. The standard assumption that juries award
compensation is a remarkably simplistic model for the behavior of a body
that probably sees itself more in the role of a Greek chorus. Assume instead
that the typical jury focuses less on the plaintiff's injury and more on the
defendant's behavior-that is, it desires more to punish than to compensate
and wishes to "send a message" that expresses its revulsion. This assumption
has particular relevance to the mass tort context where the behavior could
58. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywak Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d
1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Stover v. Rail 459 U.S. 988 (1982), "Dalkon Shield,"
526 F. Supp. 887; Coburn v. 4-R Corp, 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977), petition for mandamus
denied sub nom. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543
(6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979). See also Note, Mass Liability and Punitive
Damages Overkill, 30 HAsTINGs L.J. 1797, 1800-12 (1979); Putz & Astiz, Punitive Damage
Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out. Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F. L. R]v. 1, 18-40
(1981); Miller & Crump, supra note 12, at 42-50.

1987]

RETHINKING CLASS ACTION

have injured members of the jury, itself, had they been differently situated.
Once we make this assumption, the impact of multiple proceedings is in
effect to increase the number of quasi-sentencing proceedings that the defendant must face and thereby to expose it to cumulative punishment and, loosely
speaking, a kind of double jeopardy. To be sure, in no single action will
the damages approach the total damages awarded in the class action, but
in each individual action the jury's award will include a component that
represents a moral penalty, even though punitive damages may not be legally
obtainable. Thus, sensible as it is to certify a mandatory class action for
punitive damages so as to preclude races to the courthouse and inter-plaintiff
competition, the implicit goal of a single retributive penalty is not truly
feasible if claims for "compensation" can be pursued in multiple forums
before retributively minded fact-finders.
My premise here has some empirical foundation. A recent Rand Institute
for Civil Justice study of jury awards in Cook County, Illinois, found that
the per plaintiff recovery declined significantly as additional co-plaintiffs
were added. Specifically, as each additional plaintiff was added, the original
plaintiff on average could expect to experience a 27% decrease in his recovery.5 9 While hardly conclusive, this finding is at least consistent with the
behavior that one would expect of a jury that was responding in significant
part to moral criteria (as opposed to evidence of plaintiff's loss).
If so, what policy implications follow? From one perspective, the fact
that multiple actions expose the defendant to multiple punishment and multiple forums in which the plaintiff has the "home court" advantage seems
unfair. True as this is, however, a countervailing observation must be made.
Because the class action is likely to result in a lower fee award for the
plaintiff's attorney than the individual personal injury action (where as
previously noted a contingent percentage fee will likely be used), we should
anticipate that a lower expected recovery means a lower investment by the
attorney in the action. Obviously, an attorney who expects a fee award equal
to 40% of the recovery will invest more in discovery, expert witnesses, date
collection, and trial preparation than one who foresees only a 20% fee, and
this greater incentive should translate into a higher expected recovery. Thus,
it may be oversimplified to see the higher legal fees in individual actions as
only evidence of social waste. Some waste undoubtedly results from a proliferation of individual actions, but this waste may be more attributable to
the independent fact that overstaffing and redundant work is inevitable when
one hundred or more attorneys represent individual plaintiffs who collectively
could be represented at least as effectively by ten to twenty attorneys.

59. See A. CEiN & M. PETERSEN, DEEP PocKETs, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK
CouNTY JuRy TRIus 48 (1985).
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As noted earlier, the existence of asymmetric stakes in class action litigation
may produce under-investment in actions from the plaintiffs' collective perspective, and higher fee awards may counteract this tendency. Thus, although
the attorneys receive a bigger slice of the pie in the individual actions, it is
an open question whether this makes the pie sufficiently bigger to justify
the higher percentage.
While it would be an overstatement to conclude that plaintiffs are therefore
better off in individual actions (because obviously much of the effort so
expended is duplicative and inefficient), this illustration does point up why
a novel alternative may be the "second best" solution. Recently, in a number
of mass tort cases, litigation networks have developed by which cooperating
plaintiff's attorneys litigating separate individual actions involving the same
subject matter (for example, a particular drug or toxic product) share the
fruits of their discovery (for example, expert witnesses, epidemiological studies, depositions of the defendant's witnesses, and so on). 60 Such information
networks obviously reduce waste and achieve some of the advantages of
consolidated pre-trial discovery in a federal court, without exposing each
individual attorney to the loss of his client (and his fee award) to the attorneys
controlling the class action. Of course, redundancy still exists, and the legal
costs in the aggregate may be well above those in a mandatory class action.
Still, at least on an a prioribasis, it is not clear whether the reduced costs
associated with class actions fully offset the reduced efforts that are predictable once we reduce the attorney's incentive by lowering his fee award.
The critical and unresolvable issue is the nature of the relationship between
the attorney's investment in the action and the size of the settlement. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that defendants do fear this new insti6
tution of the litigation network and have taken steps to impede it. '
My tentative suggestion then is that multiple proceedings, each with their
overlapping focus on the moral propriety of the defendant's action, could
in a "second best" world both offset the plaintiff's attorney's lesser incentive
to expend funds on the action and marginally better protect the plaintiffs

60. The litigation network, which can exist on either plaintiff's or defendant's side of a
series of related actions, has not yet received a full descriptive account. For a useful history
of one of the first such networks, see Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Siccessful
Mass DisasterLitigation, 56 CAm. L. Rnv. 116 (1968); see Rheingold, Mass DisasterLitigation
and the Use of Plaintiffs' Groups, LmGATION, Spring 1977, at 18. For a more recent and still
unpublished account, see Galanter, Lawyers' Litigation Networks (1985) (available at University
of Wisconsin).
61. It is now common that defendants will seek protective orders with respect to pretrial
discovery and depositions in toxic tort cases in order to prevent the communication of such
information among members of a plaintiff's litigation network. Until such information is
admitted into evidence, no right of public access exists to information gathered through pretrial discovery, See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). This strategy is an
instance of defendant's usually greater ability to conduct a broad litigation campaign that looks
beyond the instant individual action.
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from collusive settlements. Thus, public goals may in fact be better served
by a proliferation of private actions than Professor Rosenberg recognizes.
Still, my hypothesis is not an argument for the preservation of the status
quo. To the extent that the lodestar formula is the real villain of the story
because it encourages structural collusion, it could easily be eliminated by
legislative or judicial action that established a variable "percentage-of-therecovery" fee formula under which the court preserved some discretion to
adjust the fee award. Mandatory class actions for punitive damages also
make considerable sense from both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' perspectives, because the possibility that the defendants will be exposed to
multiple punitive damage awards in individual actions is counterbalanced by
the possibility that multiple plaintiffs can be pressured into early and cheap
settlements if the defendant can create a race to settlement because those
who hold out for trial will be unable or ineligible to receive punitive damages. 62 Still, in any form of litigation where agency costs are predictably
high, the problem of asymmetric stakes surfaces, and policy analysis should
recognize that some litigation advantages that the plaintiffs may possess
from using multiple forums compensate (albeit imperfectly) for this factor.
Better compromises can probably be designed, but to ignore this factor may
make plaintiffs worse off.
B. Damage Averaging
Ideally, Professor Rosenberg would implement his vision of bureaucratic
justice by instructing courts in mass tort class actions to "impose damage
schedules based on the average loss suffered by members of the relevant
subclasses or even by the class as a whole." 63 As he recognizes, courts have
not yet done this, but in the settlement negotiations such a regression to the
mean may already be occurring. To understand the implications of this

62. The law on punitive damages is uncertain, but in some jurisdictions limitations exist
on multiple awards, either as a matter of statutory law or common law. See Federal Skywalk,
93 F.R.D. at 424-25; "Agent Orange," 100 F.R.D. at 728; Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 526-30 (5th Cir.) (suggesting federal common law limitation), rev'd on
other grounds, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986).
But see Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 3335 (1986). Fear that a court may impose such a limitation can cause risk-averse
plaintiff's attorneys to settle cheaply before trial because of their concern that the first action
to obtain such a verdict will preempt other recoveries of punitive damages. Where there is both
a pending class action and separate individual actions, those plaintiffs in the individual actions
appear to be particularly exposed to this pressure. See Stewart, Wake of Disaster: Controversy
Surrounds Payments to Plaintiffs in Hyatt Regency Case, Wall St. J., July 3, 1984, at 1, 12
(noting that defense attorneys in Federal Skywalk successfully pressured individual plaintiffs
to settle before trial of federal class action in order to avert possible loss of claims to punitive
damages).
63. Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 570.
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proposal, it is helpful to begin by dividing all class actions into three categories.
Category A consists of those class actions in which no individual plaintiff
has a "marketable" legal claim. That is, either because of difficulties of
proof or low recoverable injuries, such plaintiffs would not be represented
by a private attorney on a contingent fee basis and would either not find
it attractive or would be unable to pay such attorneys out of their own
pockets. Here, the availability of the class action reduces transaction costs
and thereby gives rise to litigation that would not otherwise be brought.
While Category A provides probably the fundamental rationale for the class
action, 64 it also must be recognized that it is within this context that the
attorney is most able to function as an independent and unconstrained
entrepreneur, because no individual plaintiff probably has the ability or
incentive to monitor his performance.
Category B consists conversely of those class actions in which all members
do have "marketable" legal claims. Here, the variance among claims is again
low, and the use of the class action device is dictated either by the fact that
there is a "limited fund" out of which the recovery must be satisfied (so
that all plaintiffs prefer a unified proceeding to a competitive race to judgment) or by the fact that the class action will reduce attorney's fees, prevent
"free riding," and thereby solve a "collective goods" problem. A mass
disaster, such as a plane crash or a building collapse, provides a good
illustration of this second category.
Finally, Category C is the problematic case that constantly arises in the
real world. Here, there is a high variance among the settlement values of
the legal claims possessed by the different plaintiffs; that is, some have high
value claims and some low value claims. For example, in an Agent Orange
type case, some plaintiffs may have incurred cancer or some disease known
to be caused by the toxic substance to which they were exposed for prolonged
periods; in contrast, other plaintiffs, who were exposed only briefly (if at
all), have only vague symptoms (for example, headaches and depression).
On their own, the latter plaintiffs would certainiy not sue in individual
actions and even might not be able to sue in class actions because a realistic
plaintiff's attorney would consider their chances of prevailing too weak to
justify the substantial investment of time that he would have to make. It is
important here to distinguish between claims that have low values because
of their legal merit and those that merely seek a small recovery per plaintiff.
A class action can aggregate individuals with small monetary claims into an
effective client whose legal injuries are now marketable, but it is less suc-

64. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), where the average claim was
for $100, Justice Rehnquist noted that "most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in
court if a class action were not available."
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cessful at aggregating claims uniformly having weak legal merit. For example,
if there are 1,000 citizens who wish to sue Coca-Cola on the claim that its
product has made them nervous, depressed, or impotent, it is unlikely that
aggregation of their claims will alone make them marketable. To be sure,
on a simple discounting basis, it may appear that even a 10% chance of a
plaintiff's verdict will have a significant settlement value if the claims, after
aggregation, total $100 million, but this is superficial. Weak cases may look
even worse collectively, and courts find ways not to certify such a class
action. What such "weak" plaintiffs need is a lead plaintiff (or plaintiffs)
whose claims have clear legal merit. With such a lead plaintiff, who ideally
has a vivid story to tell, the remainder of the plaintiff class may now have
a chance to tag along, in effect hiding the weakness of their claims behind
those of the lead plaintiff. Such a lead plaintiff would be well advised,
however, to opt out of the class action, because he probably has little to
gain from this association. Indeed, if his claim must be litigated through a
mandatory class action, this plaintiff is in effect required to make an involuntary wealth transfer.
On a more general level, I have elsewhere described this process as one
of "adverse selection.''65 The analogy here is to the field of insurance where
a well known phenomenon is that those persons who purchase insurance are
far more likely to be vulnerable to the risks insured against than the general
population or an actuarial sample having their overt characteristics. Similarly,
the class action disproportionately attracts "weak" plaintiffs, not simply in
the sense that these plaintiffs could not afford to sue, but in the sense that
they have legally weak claims that they wish to disguise within the general
population of the plaintiff class. Within a large enough herd, the weak
claims can hide and hope to escape notice.
This assertion has a two-fold significance. First, if non-meritorious claims
receive compensation, over-deterrence may result. I have less concern about
this danger than others may have, given my earlier emphasis on the impact
of asymmetric stakes and the incentives for collusive settlements. Still, Professor Rosenberg seems to me to oversimplify when he characterizes all
criticisms of his damage averaging proposal as based only on distributive
fairness and individual justice concerns. Efficiency concerns also are implicated, because distributive contests within the class can lead to either underdeterrence or over-deterrence.
Second, my "adverse selection" hypothesis suggests that plaintiffs with
high value legal claims will be forced to make wealth transfers to those
having lower value claims. Indeed, the dynamics of the class action bargaining

65. See J.COFFEE, TnE REGULATION OF ENTREPRENEuRIAL LITIGATION: BALANCING FRAmNEss
AND EFFICIENCY IN THE LARGE CLASS ACTION 45-46 (Sept. 1986) (Center for Law and Economic
Studies, Columbia University School of Law Working Paper No. 22).
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process seem to me to ensure such a result. The entrepreneurial attorney
who views all issues in terms of his naked self-interest may even prefer to
represent a "low stakes" plaintiff because by definition such a client will
be an ineffective monitor; or, it may be tlat such an entrepreneur can most
easily find "weak" claimants, since they will predictably outnumber others
if he undertakes a fairly random search for an eligible plaintiff who can
confer standing. To be sure, referral mechanisms exist, but they do not
necessarily match the best attorney with the strongest client. Rather, the
typical race to the courthouse inclines the attorney to take the first eligible
plaintiff once he has decided to become involved.
More importantly, voting rules within the class action do not differentiate
between "high stakes" and "low stakes" plaintiffs, and this invites overreaching. Assume in a Category C ("high variance") class action that there
are ten plaintiffs with injuries having an average provable legal value of
$100,000 and one hundred plaintiffs with injuries having an average value
of $10,000. The aggregate values of the claims held by these two classes is
the same ($1,000,000 each), but their voting power is not so long as voting
is on a "one person, one vote" basis. As a result, a proposed settlement in
which all plaintiffs would receive an "average recovery" of $20,000 would
be accepted by the "low-value" majority, although it seems clearly unfair
to the "high-value" plaintiffs. Yet this result seems exactly where Professor
Rosenberg's proposal leads once we fill in the background political dynamics.
Moreover, this same plaintiff class might be willing to accept an average
recovery of only $18,000, even though the total recovery now was well below
the $2,000,000 total settlement value of their claims. Thus, damage averaging
might be manipulated by defendants so as to reduce their total liability, and
under-deterrence can result.
Of course, a potential answer to this problem is the use of subclasses,
such of which would have to approve the settlement. However, I doubt the
feasibility of this approach as applied to the mass tort context. One cannot
simply expect plaintiffs to value their own claims accurately for this purpose.
If we tried to divide plaintiffs into a "high value" subclass and a "low
value" subclass, most would predictably describe themselves as having "high
value" injuries (but, if rational, they would still accept the foregoing $18,000
recovery if they, or their attorneys, accurately perceived the actual value of
their claims).
Perhaps subclasses could be generated in terms of specifically described
injuries (for example, death, permanent disability, loss of limbs, and so on).
Often, however, this approach will simply replicate within each subclass the
same tensions that existed within the class as a whole. Within each subclass,
"lower value" plaintiffs will rationally seek a single-valued settlement offer
that pays each plaintiff on the basis of the average value of all claims within
the subclass. To be sure, this problem can be minimized if we maximize the
use of subclasses and thereby reduce the variance possible within any sub-
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class.66 But this approach carries with it problems of its own. Chief among
these is the question whether each subclass is to be given a veto power over
the entire settlement's approval. If not, it is possible for the other classes
to settle, leaving the lone dissenting class with little negotiating leverage.
Conversely, if any subclass can prevent the settlement's overall approval,
the prospect for extortion is high. Such a minority veto invites the lowest
valued class to exploit its position and nuisance value in order to demand
67
a wealth transfer by the other classes.
An even more serious problem with subclassing as a proposed solution to
intra-class conflicts is that it cannot differentiate between litigants whose
claims would have substantial merit at trial and those whose claims approach
the frivolous. Thus, even if it were possible to define homogenous subclasses
in terms of injuries (for example, death, total disability, and so on), these subclasses would still have a high internal variance in terms of the litigation strength
of the claims within each subclass. For example, among those plaintiffs suffering
total disability, there may be some whose injuries derive from an entirely
different source or who were contributorily negligent. Such plaintiffs represent an example of adverse selection at work, because it is almost irrational
for them not to join the class action if they can anticipate being grouped
within a subclass whose members will receive substantial awards pursuant

66. Increasing the number of subclasses does not necessarily reduce the variance among
claims; it depends on how the subclasses are defined. For example, if we defined subclasses A
and B in terms of whether their members were injured before or after a specified date (because
additional defendants also began to engage in the allegedly tortious conduct at that point), it
is unlikely that this multiplication of the subclasses will reduce claim variance. Only if we can
define injuries and subclasses in a way that relates to their settlement value is variance likely
to be reduced. If such a definition of the subclasses is possible (and I am skeptical that it often
is), then the client's incentive to opt out can be reduced; the trade-off would involve whether
the "higher stakes" plaintiff (within that subclass) believed he would receive a recovery in an
individual action that exceeded the "averaged" recovery for that subclass by a margin that
was greater than the increased transaction costs that he would bear from opting out. Of course,
the plaintiffs attorneys might have independent reasons for preferring to opt out, because of
their preference for contingent fees.
To give a concrete example, if the net average recovery for a subclass were likely to be
$50,000 and a specific plaintiff believed his injuries would yield a $75,000 recovery, his rational
calculus would have to consider whether the marginal cost of opting out and pursuing an
individual action would exceed $25,000 (plus the time value of any greater delay). If we assume
that plaintiff's attorneys would demand a 33 1/3% (or greater) contingent fee, there would be
no incentive for the plaintiff to opt out here, because the plaintiff's expected net recovery
would be greater in the class action. To be sure, the individual plaintiff's ability to make these
comparisons is doubtful.
67. Some settlements have actually involved explicit payments to "buy off" nuisance claims
in order "to secure the agreement" of each subclass to the settlement. See West Virginia v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1084-88 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'g, 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) ($3 million "nuisance" award), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). Although courts may
believe that such nuisance value payments are borne by the defendants, it is also possible that
they represent wealth transfers by one plaintiff class to another. See also Plummer v. Chemical
Bank, 91 F.R.D. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982); Holmes v. Continental
Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (1lth Cir. 1983).
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to damage scheduling. Not surprisingly, those who favor subclassing (such
as Professor Rosenberg) tend also to downplay the significance of causation
and affirmative defenses. Perhaps, they assume that defendants with deep
pockets should bear the cost of compensating even plaintiffs whose actions
would be unmarketable on an individual basis on the theory that this additional liability generates more deterrence. Yet, the real cost bearer may be
the other plaintiffs within the subclass (or other subclasses) who are forced
to make an involuntary wealth transfer in the form of their diminished share
of the action's recovery.
My sense is that these tensions within and between subclasses have not
yet publicly surfaced for three distinct reasons. First, contemporary judicial
practice has not made a serious attempt to structure subclasses in terms of
the monetary value of the plaintiffs' claims; instead, courts typically have
used more overt physical, geographic, and chronological characteristics."
Sometimes courts simply tell all plaintiffs to "share-and-share alike"-a
result that in effect legitimates wealth transfers. 69 This approach simply
compresses the same tensions into those subclasses that are characterized by
a high variance in claim values. Second, lawyers today so totally dominate
the process and pursue their own independent interests (which usually favor
an early settlement) that the real conflicts among their clients may never
surface. Third and most important, the "high-value" plaintiff has in the
past generally had an available remedy by which to protect himself: he could
opt out and thereby escape the tyranny of the "low stakes" majority. Yet,
if we begin to restrict opting out in favor of bureaucratic justice, we must
expect these problems to surface and must be prepared to design either
voting rules or related procedures to ensure fair representation.
At this point, my central concern about Professor Rosenberg's proposal
for bureaucratic justice can be advanced. Put simply, we have seen systems
of bureaucratic justice operate in several related areas of the law to apportion
claims against a third party, and in each case the outcome has been the
same: wealth transfers have been encouraged. Two examples merit brief
discussion. Bankruptcy law supplies the closest analogy to the mandatory
class action because by definition we are dealing in it with a "limited fund"

68. One reason for this tendency involves the frequent presence of multiple defendants, not
all of whom are liable to the same plaintiffs. Also, different subclasses may possess different
substantive causes of action. Thus, in a securities class action, one subclass may have a cause
of action under some express remedy (such as § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933) while another
subclass may only be able to assert liability under Rule lOb-5. Or, different subclasses may
have relied upon different alleged misstatements.
69. In the CorrugatedContainerantitrust litigation, the court approved a "share-and-sharealike plan of distribution," despite clear differences in the legal merits among claims (some of
which were probably time barred by the statute of limitations), because the administrative
difficulties in valuing the individual claims made discrimination among plaintiffs infeasible. See
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) § 64,114, at 76,718
(S.D. Texas 1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1981).
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and multiple classes. The conflict among these various subclasses is explicit
in bankruptcy: secured creditors, unsecured creditors, trade creditors, preferred stockholders, common stockholders, and other special groups, such
as employees, are all contending for their share of a limited pie. By almost
all accounts, the process of corporate reorganization under the supervision
of the bankruptcy court has tended to result in the junior creditors finding
means by which to overreach senior creditors (chiefly by overvaluing the
consideration paid to them).7 0 This has occurred even in the face of an
absolute priority rule that formally entitled the senior creditor to "full value"
before junior creditors received anything.
In response to these problems, -Congress adopted The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, which, while it partially abandoned the absolute priority rule,
did so only with respect to reorganization plans that were accepted by at
least two-thirds in amount and more than one half in number of the "allowed
claims" of the creditor class. 7 ' In effect, this supermajority requirement is
a recognition of the inevitable imperfections of voting rules. As a result,
the Bankruptcy Act contemplates that the court will appoint the representatives of each class who are to negotiate on the class's behalf, and the Act
intends these persons to be those with the largest claims in the class.72 Such
a system parallels my earlier proposal that the largest plaintiff be given a
preference in the choice of the lead counsel on the grounds that he will
normally be the best monitor. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Act's emphasis on
judicial appointment of the class representative differs from existing procedures in the class action where the participating plaintiff's attorneys typically elect the lead plaintiff's counsel and the steering committee. In this
respect, the Bankruptcy Act implicitly recognizes the failure of elections and
substitutes a regulatory paternalism. In both the class action and bankruptcy
contexts, the same danger exists that small claimants will outvote larger
claimants, but in the Bankruptcy Act this problem is directly addressed by
requiring supermajority approval in terms of the aggregate economic interest

70. Cf. V. BRUDNEY & M. CmaELSTmN, CASES AND MATERALS oN CoRPoRATE nmANcE
123-74 (2d ed. 1979). The ability of the junior creditors to cause delay and expense has been
thought to enable them to compel senior creditors to settle for less than their contractual rights.
In response to this problem, the courts created the "absolute priority rule" to minimize the
leverage that such nuisance value gave the junior creditor. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
71. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982) (defining "acceptance" of plan to require approval by
two-thirds in principal amount of all allowed claims and majority in number). A plan that is
not "accepted" by a class may still be judicially approved under the more rigorous "cram
down" provisions. Id. at § 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985). A similar rule requiring approval by
two thirds in amount plus a majority in number was contained in § 179 of the predecessor
Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 579).
72. For a discussion of these procedures, which obviously reflect a distrust of a simple
democratic bargaining model, see V. BRuDNEY & M. CmasTar, supra note 70, at 142-43.
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in the action. 73 To be sure, this procedure cannot be easily translated to the
class action where no mechanisms exist for "allowing" claims prior to the
vote on the settlement plan. Clearly a "one dollar, one vote" rule would
serve mainly to escalate the claimed value of each plaintiff's claims. But, if

so, alternative procedures must be found.
Another context in which multiple classes bargain over the distribution of
a fund to be received from a common adversary is collective bargaining.
Here again, commentators have concluded that the dynamics tend to favor

the voting majority of lower salaried workers at the expense of higher salaried

workers.7 4 Possibly as a result, there are some express limitations in the
Labor Management Relations Act which are intended to preclude the "per-

manent submergence" of one group within a larger bargaining unit. For
example, professional employees cannot be placed in a non-professional unit

without their consent. 75 How well these protections work is open to question,
but their failures are likely to foreshadow worse problems that will emerge

in the class action context if opting out is seriously restricted.
III.

SCENARIOS FOR MASS TORT REFORM

My starting point for thinking about reform of the "mass tort" class

action is that two rationales justify mandatory class actions, while other
73. Note, however, that in Los Angeles Lumber Prod., 92% of the bondholders consented
to the participation by the stockholders, but the Supreme Court still found the proposed plan
invalid. This high vote suggests that even a supermajority requirement may not give adequate
protection. Conflicts of interest appear to have been as prevalent in this context as in the class
action, because the investment bankers who usually played a decisive role in devising the plan
were often aligned with management and the stockholders and thus did not efficiently represent
the senior security holders.
74. See Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective
Choice, 56 S. CAira. L. REv. 461, 477 (1983); Finkin, The Limits of MajorityRule in Collective
Bargaining, 64 MnN. L. Rav. 183, 218-21 (1980). Some studies have found instances in specific
unions where the skilled workers suffered a significant deterioration in their wage position
relative to unskilled workers. See R. MAcDONALD, CouacTrvE BAaGAN'o IN THE AUTOMOBIE
INDusTRY 158 (1963) (discussing wage bargaining within the law). Freed, Polsby & Spitzer,
supra, cite the case of the American Federation of Musicians which for thirteen years did not
negotiate a wage increase for one group of skilled musicians in order to prefer unskilled
workers. Id. at 477.
Professor Rosenberg responds in his Article to this assertion by arguing that the labor
analogy teaches that the strongest subclass will dominate the negotiations. See Rosenberg, supra
note 32, at 584 n.92. Even if this is so, it is not clear that the subclass of "high stakes"
plaintiffs will have a higher aggregate value than the potentially far more numerous subclass
of plaintiffs with low valued claims. If the latter have a higher aggregate value, then under
Professor Rosenberg's own analysis they should dominate the negotiations, even if their individual claims are virtually unmarketable. Also, the problem of adverse selection may interfere
with the negotiating strength of the "high stakes" subclass if this subclass comes to include a
large number of "feigned" high stakes plaintiffs (who will not want to go to trial).
75. Labor Management Relations Act § 9(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1982). See also
Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, supra note 74, at 477-78 (noting policy of preventing "permanent
submergence" of one group within a bargaining unit and limited efficacy of this policy).
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concerns probably do not. First, the same basic "prisoner's dilemma" problem underlies both class actions and corporate re-organization practice in
bankruptcy.7 6 In both contexts, if claimants were permitted to proceed individually, the aggregate recovery may be reduced. Moreover, because early

plaintiffs could deprive later claimants by depleting the fund from which
the recovery is to be satisfied, there is a high risk of substantial variance

among recoveries, which risk averse plaintiffs would prefer to avoid even
at some cost in the mean recovery. Finally, piecemeal litigation may also
reduce the aggregate size of this fund. 77 The answer to this problem is for
the parties to agree on concerted action: namely, a common action. The
second justification is the problem of "free riding"; some means must be
found to tax the free rider, and a mandatory class action is one available
means. Thus, the economic case for some kind of mandatory class action
is strong. But what kind? These rationales point only to the need for a

common proceeding and cost sharing, whether by means of mass consolidating or a mandatory class action, and they do not suggest any need for

damage averaging. Moreover, I find Professor Rosenberg's confidence about
the merits of "bureaucratic justice" to be unsupported by the results that

have been observed for decades in the most closely comparable areas: collective bargaining and corporate reorganizations. This does not mean that
I would reject the mandatory class action, but procedures must be found
by which to domesticate it.

It is considerably easier to point out why most obvious reforms will not
work than to identify those that may work. Both in theory and in practice,
voting rules seem unlikely to alleviate the problems associated with the class

action. The theoretical problems associated with voting rules-basically the

76. For a standard discussion of the "prisoner's dilemma" problem, see R. LuCE & H.
RAiFFA, GAMEs & DEcisioNs (1957). Because the term now appears to be in common use (and

misuse), I will not set forth the standard elements in this bargaining game, but its central
feature is that, because cooperation cannot be assured, rational behavior by individuals leads
to a sub-optimal decision from a collective viewpoint. Cf. Gilson, A StructuralApproach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819,
859-62 (1981).
Here, each plaintiff, unless assured of cooperation among plaintiffs, win attempt to "beat
out" the other plaintiffs in a race to the courthouse, because they all fear that the defendants'
assets will not prove sufficient to satisfy all claims (or they fear that only the first judgment
creditors will be eligible to receive punitive damages). The game is not, however, a zero sum
one, because this race produces excess transaction costs (i.e., the multiple legal fees of all the
claimants) and may reduce the value of the defendants' assets through piecemeal liquidation.
Also, such a race among claimants produces variance among individual recoveries, which to
risk averse plaintiffs is a disadvantage for which they would prefer to substitute some reduction
in the mean recovery. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 861-67 (1982) (describing similar reasons why a collective
bankruptcy proceeding is preferable to a competition for individual recoveries).
77. See Jackson, supra note 76, at 864-65 (going concern value of business may exceed its
liquidation value and only collective proceeding can realize upon it).
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Arrow theorem and the likelihood of agenda manipulation 7TS-are well-known
and will not be re-assessed here. Any practical attempt at implementation
also seems likely to flounder on more prosaic problems. A "one person,
one vote" voting rule seems likely to aggravate the problem of adverse
selection discussed earlier. Conversely, a "one share, one vote" rule cannot
work in this context where there is no mechanism for determining at the
settlement stage the value that each claimant may rightfully place on his
claim. That a "one share, one vote" rule works well in the bankruptcy
context derives from the fact that voting on a re-organization plan only
occurs after "allowable claims" are first established. 79 This difference underscores the basic infeasibility of voting procedures in large class actions:
while potentially thousands, even tens of thousands, will be bound by a
settlement, few are likely to vote on it or respond in any way, even if they
can be reached and given adequate notice and disclosure.8 0 Response rates
are likely to resemble those for direct mail advertising or public opinion
questionnaires. If instead we ask the attorneys to vote, this approach invites
sophisticated attempts to stuff the ballot box as attorneys invite their partners
and friends into the action in order to secure their votes.8'
In the bankruptcy context, justifiable skepticism about the bargaining
process resulted in the judicial adoption of a legal rule-the absolute priority
doctrine-to protect those claimants most exposed to abuse (the senior creditors). No such substantive rule seems apparent that would work similarly
in the class action field to protect plaintiffs with "high value" claims. Thus,
we come full circle back to the topic of the mandatory class action and the
right to opt out.
Several options therefore need to be compared on the policy level, even
if they are not currently available under existing law.
A.

A Limited Opt-Out: Restricting BureaucraticJustice to the
Liability Determination

Current practice is to certify a class action only with respect to the common
questions of law and fact concerning liability and to permit each plaintiff

78. For a concise discussion of the problems of collective choice, see Freed, Polsby &
Spitzer, supra note 74. They are in no sense unique to that context, nor more or less easily
solved (if solvable at all).
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982). The subject of how claims are proven in bankruptcy
in order to acquire voting rights is beyond the scope of this Article, but suffice it to say that
no equivalent procedure could be structured into the litigation process without significantly
complicating settlement (which is the method by which 90% or so of all civil actions are
resolved).
80. For a sense of the limited ability of most lay persons to understand or respond intelligently to legal notices, even when carefully written and relatively clear, see Miller & Crump,
supra note 12, at 22-23 & n.162.
81. For an instance in which this has apparently occurred, see Coffee, supra note 37, at
248-61; see also In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
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the right to an individual trial on the issue of damages. 2 Although Professor
Rosenberg would move well beyond this stage, this compromise arguably
has the desirable effect of protecting the rights of "high stakes" plaintiffs
to an individualized damage determination. The problem with this compromise comes at the settlement stage. If the court certifies a mandatory class
action and if a settlement is proposed and accepted, this right is effectively
lost. An obvious compromise then would be to certify a mandatory class
action as to liability and causation issues, but permit opting out exclusively
as to damage determinations. Critics may respond to this proposal that it
will again create a competition over the "limited fund" that justified mandatory class certification. However, this conclusion need not follow. To be
sure, such a "prisoner's dilemma" would result if each plaintiff could rush
back to his home forum to seek damages, but permission to do so need not
be granted. If the same court that determined the amount of liability were
also to apportion it among the claimants, both the goals of administrative
efficiency and relative equity seem achievable in principle. In effect, the
court could determine at the time it approves the settlement a "benchmark"
or average award for the class or each subclass. It would then realize that
any time it awarded above average damages, it would have to compensate
in other cases by corresponding amounts.
Alternatively, the court could use a "points" system, awarding points for
the severity of each individual injury (and other relevant factors) and ultimately dividing this total number of points into the fund to determine the
dollar award per point. In practice, this approach might closely resemble
damage scheduling in some hands, but, because it preserves the right to opt
out, it better avoids the problem created by the Supreme Court's decision
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, which may have given constitutional
stature to the right to opt out."3 Although this approach would not alone
cure the problem of adverse selection (only mandatory individualized damage
determinations would do that), it would reduce the amount of the wealth
transfers possible by giving those with the highest damages the ability to
opt out partially. This approach would have clear advantages in terms of
administrative efficiency in comparison to wholly individualized proceedings,
and it would produce less of an incentive to opt out because of the attorney's
own self-interest in a contingent fee because all fee awards could still be
controlled by the court as an aspect of the class action.
B.

Chilling the Right to Opt Out

If, either as a matter of constitutional law or legislative preference, the
plaintiff must be given a full right to opt out in all except "true" limited
82. See Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 568-69; Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 83 F.R.D.
382 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983).
83. 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see also Miller & Crump, supra note 12, at 39.
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fund cases, another policy response could be to chill the exercise of that

right. One possibility that I have raised elsewhere is to compensate plaintiff's
attorneys who opt out of the class action after its filing only to the extent

they obtain a recovery in excess of the average amount awarded to plaintiffs

in the same class or subclass . 4 That is, if the class award were $50,000 per
plaintiff and the attorney who opted out obtained an $80,000 recovery, the
court in setting his fee award would base it only on the marginal $30,000
by which he bettered the subclass's recovery. The rationale for such a rule

resembles that underlying Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15
In opting out, the plaintiff imposes costs on his adversary and on the judicial
system, just as he does by rejecting a reasonable settlement offer that he is
unable to better at trial. In both cases, he should bear some of these private

and social costs by receiving a reduced fee when he is relatively unsuccessful.
Here, the appropriate cost-bearer is the attorney, not the client, because the

attorney is uniquely subject to a conflict of interest in this area: he may be
opting out in order to obtain higher compensation under a contingent fee
agreement. The specifics of this proposal need not be discussed further here,
but my basic claim is that even if a right to opt out exists, society need

not subsidize the decision to opt out and may reasonably tax it. Other
alternatives are also easily imagined. For example, the client who opts out
could be taxed for a share of the discovery costs on which he would otherwise
6
be able to free ride.1

84. See Coffee, supra note 65, at 53-56. This proposal would require the court to supervise
and limit contingent fees in individual actions, which power it does not currently exercise.
Basically, fee awards in individual "tag along" cases must be integrated with class action fee
awards in order to reduce the perverse incentives that today exist for plaintiff's attorneys to
opt out to improve their own economic position.
85. Under Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), a party forfeits his or her right to statutorily
awarded fees when the party declines a settlement offer made pursuant to Rule 68 and then
fails to do better at trial. By analogy, a decision to opt out resembles a decision to reject a
settlement offer (except that it in effect rejects an offer made by the other plaintiffs participating
in the class action), and it imposes costs on these other plaintiffs. Alternatively, the party could
be required to share some portion of the class action's costs. My proposal would probably
require legislative action but it is a compromise that maintains the individual's right to opt out
but makes the plaintiff (or the plaintiff's attorney) bear some of the costs of that decision.
One variant on this proposal might be to deny statutory fee awards to the individual plaintiff
on the theory that it forces the defendants to pay twice (i.e., to the class and to the individual
plaintiff), unless the plaintiff can show that his decision was justified by his "success."
86. Some efforts to tax "opting out" plaintiffs in a mass tort class action have already
occurred. In "Agent Orange," Judge Jack Weinstein charged the plaintiff's attorneys who
opted out for a share of the discovery costs incurred by the plaintiff's management committee
in the class action on the grounds that they had benefitted from such discovery. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1317 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Letter
from Federal District Court Judge Jack Weinstein to the Author (October 23, 1986) (copy on
file at Indiana Law Journal).
The problem with Judge Weinstein's preferred solution of assessing opting-out plaintiffs
"at the time they make use of MDL discovery materials," Weinstein letter, supra at 1317, is
that it is exactly this stage at which plaintiff's attorneys are least willing to invest in the action.
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C. The Bankruptcy Alternative
In practice, those most likely to favor mandatory class certification today
appear to be the major defendants in mass tort cases.8 7 They do so both
because they fear continuing uncertainty, the repetitive award of punitive
damages, and a Gulliver-like struggle against an army of Lilliputian plaintiffs
who are increasingly learning to share costs through litigation networks.
Even if these concerns are valid, however, it does not follow that they should
justify sacrifice of the "high stakes" plaintiffs' interests. The other forum
available to defendants is the bankruptcy court, which could be authorized
to scale down excessive tort awards, invalidate multiple punitive damage
recoveries, and generally seek to achieve equity among similarly situated
plaintiff classes. 8 Its key attractions from a public law perspective is that

Given asymmetric stakes and substantial risk, this required early investment will erode the
litigation cost differential on which they depend. Or, it may cause plaintiffs either to forego
use of the discovery materials compiled in the class action or to undertake duplicative discovery
(either of which results are undesirable from a public law standpoint). Moreover, a determined
trial court can easily use this technique to chill opting out completely by imposing a high price
on discovery materials. Because the power to tax is the power to destroy, I prefer a rule that
cannot be manipulated to prohibit opting out. In this light, the superiority of a fee formula
that only compensates the plaintiff's attorney on the basis of the net improvement that he
obtains over the class action is that it establishes fixed and clear incentives and does not expose
the attorney to a prohibitory tax that a judge could impose who wished to preclude opting
out. Such fee-based regulation could also be implemented, as Judge Weinstein noted in Agent
Orange, by subjecting all private fee arrangements involving plaintiffs who opt out to judicial
approval and requiring all "counsel in such cases to report to the court any fee received so
that an appropriate percentage could be ordered paid to the class ....

"

Id.

Some will predictably argue that my proposal (or similar proposals) impermissibly chills a
constitutional right to opt out, which Shutts may have recognized. See supra note 83. Still,
my proposal is probably a less serious obstacle to the plaintiff who wishes to opt out than is
the taxing formula adopted by Judge Weinstein. In addition, it would probably be constitutional
(although undesirable on policy grounds) to authorize two-way fee shifting with respect to
plaintiffs who opt out.
Finally, if the argument is raised that the client could not find an attorney willing to take his
case under my proposed fee formula (which I doubt), a modification could be adopted
under which the client could himself accept liability for use of the discovery materials obtained
in the class action. Ultimately, the public policy goal should be not to preclude or chill opting
out, but to align the plaintiff's attorney's incentives with respect to this decision with those of
his client. This is what a fee formula focused on the incremental gain expected from the
individual action uniquely does; it leads the attorney to seek to opt out only in circumstances
where the rational client in possession of the same knowledge and expertise would have
authorized this decision.
87. See supra note 52.
88. Some commentary has objected to the use of bankruptcy as a means by which to resolve
tort claims in mass disaster cases. See Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Claims
in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. Rlv. 1121 (1982); Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy:
Curbing Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy Code by IndustrialPolluters, 85 COLUM. L. Rv.
870 (1985). But see Roe, CorporateStrategicReaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REv. 846 (1984).
I do not argue that bankruptcy has not been misused but that it has great potential as the
superior forum. Ironically, Johns-Manville's attempt to use bankruptcy to evade toxic tort
claims for asbestos appears to have failed badly. See Mitchell, Negative Verdict: Manville's
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it offers a collective centralized proceeding that responds to the "prisoner's
dilemma" problem. While this approach would be more costly to defendants
(because the bankruptcy court would also have greater power to oust management and generally realign relationships among creditors), it is arguable
that such a price should be placed on the defendant's ability to escape
individualized assessments of its responsibility. No specific proposals are
here offered, but it needs to be clearly recognized that the bankruptcy
proceeding is a substitute procedure for the mandatory class action and
perhaps has been the leading historical example of bureaucratic justice administered by a court.
CONCLUSION

This Article has chiefly sought to frame alternatives and point out some
of the considerations on which policy analysis should focus. That is the
easier task, and I leave to others the much harder task of tailoring a policy
within these parameters.
In overview, one last generalization, however, cannot be resisted. Class
actions are too easily conceptualized as a process by which individual plaintiffs organize to advance their claims against their legal adversary. This is
only half the story. Often, the more difficult and contentious disputes involve
the distribution of the recovery, both within the class and between attorney
and client. Visions of "bureaucratic justice" must be tested against that
reality. Moreover, the usual egalitarian values that underlie proposals that
move differently situated individuals toward the mean seem largely inapplicable to the mass tort context where plaintiffs are differentiated less by
class, race, or wealth than by the severity of their injuries. 9 Against such
a backdrop, the propriety of asking "high stakes" plaintiffs to subsidize
"low stakes" plaintiffs seems to raise more troubling issues of justice than
its proponents have yet recognized.

Bid to Evade Avalanche of Lawsuits Proves Disappointing, Wall St. J., July 15, 1986, at 1,
col. 7; Glaberson & Atchison, Manville's Asbestos Victims May Have Won the Store, Busnrss
WEEK, August 12, 1985, at 23. Not only has its senior management been replaced by the

bankruptcy court, but as much as 80% of its common stock may be placed in a trust fund
for victims and two plaintiffs' attorneys have been placed on its board of directors. I am
unaware of any mass tort class actions that have been this successful from the plaintiffs'
perspective. Uniquely, this forum can better respond to future victims and claimants by revising
the firm's capital structure.
89. I recognize that wealth and class correlate positively with the likely economic recovery
that the same physical injury will support for different individuals. Still, I think this point is
of secondary significance in most mass tort cases, in part because of the greater significance
in my judgement of the problem of adverse selection which might allow "weak" plaintiffs to
obtain wealth transfers in class actions from "strong" plaintiffs if damage averaging were
followed.

